


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Publisher: Routledge

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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20>

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Version of record first published: 15 Nov 2012.

To cite this article: Behnam Said (2012): Hymns (Nasheeds): A Contribution to the Study of the Jihadist Culture, *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 35:12, 863-879

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2012.720242>

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Hymns (*Nasheeds*): A Contribution to the Study of the *Jihadist* Culture

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This article deals with militant Islamist hymns (anasheed jihadiya; in the following simply referred to as nasheeds) as an expression of jihadist culture. In this context jihadism is regarded as a militant fraction within the Salafi movement, with which it shares goals but not means.¹ The jihadist culture as a tool to create a common jihadist identity and to mobilize new recruits is probably as important as its ideology is. In 2004 Marc Sageman made the following remarks in his book Understanding Terror Networks: "... social bonds play a more important role in the emergence of the global Salafi jihad than ideology."² The history of nasheeds will be traced back as well as an analysis of its contents and usage will be given.

German scholar Thomas Bauer noticed that it is passion not ideas that makes a terrorist.³ This passion, Bauer stated, not only generates deadly attacks but also poetry and essays, which gives a deep inside look into the mind of the militants.⁴ Bauer does not mention *nasheeds*, but songs are at least as relevant for the *jihadist* movement as poetry is. This thesis is underlined by an interesting statement Anwar al-Awlaqi, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike in Yemen on 27 September 2011, made in his pamphlet "44 Ways to Support Jihad":

In the time of Rasulullah (saaws) he had poets who would use their poetry to inspire the Muslims and demoralize the disbelievers. Today Naschid can play that role. A good Naschid can spread so widely it can reach to an audience that you could not reach through a lecture or a book. Naschids are especially inspiring to the youth, who are the foundation of Jihad in every age and time. Nasheeds are an important element in creating a "Jihad culture." Nasheeds are abundant in Arabic but scarce in English. Hence it is important for talented poets and talented singers to take up this responsibility. The nasheeds can cover topics such as: Martyrdom, Jihad is our only solution, support of the present day leaders of Jihad (to connect the youth to them), the situation of the Ummah, the

Received 27 March 2012; accepted 6 May 2012.

This article presents the most important findings of the author's current Ph.D. project, which is supervised by Prof. Tilman Seidensticker, Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena, Germany.

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responsibility of the youth, the victory of Islam and defending the religion. The *nasheeds* should focus on Justice rather than peace and strength rather than weakness. The *nasheeds* should be strong and uplifting and not apologetic and feminine.⁵

Also, official authorities in some Arab countries got aware of the negative effects *jihadi nasheeds* can have. According to one posting in a *jihadi* Internet forum selling and buying of the album “Lan nansakum” (We will not forget you) by the notorious *munshid* (*nasheed* singer) Abu Hajir was banned in Iraq.⁶ It is further told that security forces interrogated one shop owner to see if he sells the record, which shows—the authenticity of the posting presupposed—that the security forces strive to implement the prohibition actively.

Hymns are not only extensively used in propaganda videos but they are also getting distributed via the Internet in the form of audiofiles and their texts are also distributed that way.

In the most popular *jihadi* forums you find special sections for “*sautiyat*” (audios), where almost all kind of *jihadi* songs are available, sometimes even whole *nasheed* collections with more than 400 tracks. The Iraq-orientated al-Boraq Forum, for example, has got a subsection that is called *muntada l-anasheed* (*nasheed* forum), in which songs and lyrics are available. Also, the website of the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (Taliban) offers radical songs, which they call “*tarana*” (Pashto and Dari). Besides forums and websites *nasheeds* are distributed via YouTube channels, Facebook, as well as ringtones for the mobile phone.

In most cases militant *nasheeds* are composed in Arabic, but by now you also find *nasheeds* in other languages. Some of them, like Pashtu, Urdu, Turkish, and Bosnian, spoken in Islamic countries but nowadays there are also songs in English, German, or Dutch. This reflects that not only the *umma* has become global and virtual but also its most radical elements, namely the *jihadists*.

Despite their obvious relevance and quantity, *jihadist nasheeds* have been a poor object for research. A reason for this might be that poetry and especially Arab poetry is more difficult to gain access to than ideological writings. At the moment there are only a few less extensive works on this subject. The first one who took a deeper interest in *jihadi nasheeds* was Tilman Seidensticker, who published his first essay about this topic in 2006.⁷ Seidensticker gained interest by watching a video showing the wedding of Said Bahaji, one of the 9/11 conspirators. On this occasion some *jihadi nasheeds* were sung by the guests. Seidensticker then got aware of the role *nasheeds* play in the *jihadist* milieu: “Of particular interest are the songs in scenes 4 and 5, as they represent a genre of religiously imbued music that apparently plays an enormous role in Jihadist circles.”⁸

In 2009 Rüdiger Lohlker published his edition of primary sources “Dschihadismus,” which includes a very short part about *nasheeds*.⁹ Johnathan Pieslak then compared some *jihadist* songs to the music used in the U.S. military.¹⁰

Besides the cited examples there are no further works about this issue known so far.¹¹ Thus, for now, this study is the first attempt to analyze *nasheeds* systematically. To reach this aim, in a first step an overview about the historic development will be given. Furthermore, the legal stance of Salafi scholars and the Muslim brotherhood toward *nasheeds* will be compared. After the theoretical work, some examples of *jihadi* hymns will be analyzed, for the following four major categories will build the frame: (1) Battle hymns, (2) Martyr hymns, (3) Mourning hymns, and (4) Praising hymns.

Most *nasheeds* used in propaganda videos fit into one of the given categories. There are more *nasheeds*, which are not subsumed under one special category due to the reasons that they are less common in *jihadi* publications than other ones. These *nasheeds* are related to Palestine, prisoners, or current political situations. An example for a Palestine *nasheed*

is “Sahm al-Ams” (The arrow of yesterday) by the aforementioned ‘Abu Ali. This song has been used by Al Qaeda in its video “al-Quds lan tuhawwada” (Jerusalem will not be judaized) from 19 July 2010 as well as in the “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib” film “Adkhulu al-bab ‘aleihim” (Enter through the door against them), which was released in July 2011. The song’s text is about the loss of Jerusalem and Palestine and the loss of dignity, which can be restored only by means of fighting for the land. The text itself is not militant but is apparently attractive for the militant scene as we can conclude from the fact that core Al Qaeda and its branches used this song for their videos.¹²

The texts of the *nasheeds* will be analyzed under some formal criteria like rhyme, meter, and used language. The standard for a comparison in most cases will be the classical *qaseeda*. This comparison is legitimate because the *jihadi* poetry can be seen as an extension of the neoclassical anti-colonial *qaseeda*, which has its origin in the nineteenth century.¹³ This school of literature keeps the classical specifications on rhyme and meter but changes the given static subjects of Arab lyric. It deals with the own identity “in a world threatened by alien forces”¹⁴ and is strictly “in opposition to colonialism.”¹⁵

There are also some textual compositions that are more “free verse”-orientated, but the neoclassical style has been found far more often.

This study has looked at a wide range of available militant hymns. The term *jihadi nasheeds* is the translation of the widely used Arabic expression “*anasheed jihadiya*” or “*unshuda jihadiya*.” By this term the Internet was searched for relevant songs. Furthermore, between 2010 and 2011 relevant *Jihadi* websites have been screened for published songs. In addition, many videos have been analyzed in regard to songs used in it. This approach made sure that the material is representative for the global scene, not only for a single country or a single organization. The collected material was also compared with the available *nasheed* collections, like the one on the important website *tawhed.ws*. For the historical analysis, eight *nasheed* collections from the 1980s build the main sources.¹⁶ Due to this approach a core of most relevant *nasheeds* could be extracted.¹⁷ Out of these songs some examples are presented in this article.

History of *Nasheeds*

Surprisingly, many *nasheeds* used today in videos by terrorist organizations can be traced back to the early 1980s and late ‘70s, the decades that are known as the era of “Islamic resurrection” (*al-sahwa al-islamiya*). Several sources—in the form of text and audio—are supporting this thesis. It was at that time when the battle between Islamists and government in countries like Syria and Egypt became harsher and even violent than ever. But this battle was not only about weapons but also about cultural domination. The Islamists in Egypt criticized the mainstream media for their immoral contents and regarded this media as part of a campaign against Islam.¹⁸ Charles Hirschkind wrote in his book *The Ethical Soundscape* about the cultural conflict in Egypt in the 1970s:

For these *khutaba’*, popular music, and much of television and film, corrupts the heart or soul, instilling desires in people that lead them to take up un-Islamic activities.

What is at stake here is not simply a case of political criticism being deflected onto the safer realm of culture. According to many *khutaba’* in Egypt, most of the programs presented on state-controlled television engage and direct the sense toward moral dispositions, states of the soul that are incompatible with the virtues upon which an Islamic society rests.¹⁹

Nasheeds were one of the instruments used by Islamists to win the battle on public influence. In the preface to their *nasheed* collection “Anāšīd ad-da’ wa al-islāmīya” Husnī Adham Ğarār and Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Latīf al-Ġada’ made an interesting remark about the importance of poems and nasheeds in the context of a cultural conflict:

If we look at the present we need enthusiast poems and revolutionary nasheeds. Because Islam . . . needs nasheeds, remembering the glorious times of the past, documenting the ongoing Jihad and outline the way into the future. The youth of the *da’wa* needs nasheeds to arouse in them the sense for the cause which needs protections and the love to sacrifice. Our enemies have tried to take away from us this instrument [poems and nasheeds] in spreading national nasheeds and filthy songs, hoping that the young Muslims would turn towards them.²⁰

Another relevant *nasheed* collection was published by Marwan Kajak. He describes, in accordance to similar accounts of that era, the spreading of *nasheeds* in the 1970s:

Those nasheeds became gradually a commitment to the relevance of the Quran and the teachings of Islam, until the last decade of the 14th century [equal to the ‘70s of the Gregorian calendar] occurred. . . . This sort [of *nasheeds*] played an enormous role and the people began to circulate cassettes with those nasheeds, to sing and to remember them. Young and old sounded them. Their celebrations, festivals and other occasions were flooded by them [nasheeds], by what their feelings broke out and the hope grew. The picture of Islamic occasions, as we used to know then, changed to the effect that they became lessons in Islamic doctrine, honest sermons and guiding for which people were looking for since centuries.²¹

In Syria the upcoming Islamic movement and its confrontation with the Assad regime were accompanied by several Islamic protest singers, such as Abu Mazin, Abu Ratib, and Abu Dujana. Abu Ratib wrote that his group “al-Huda” began to publish records “with Islamic nasheeds which accompanied the important events which had befallen the *umma* at those times.”²²

The songs of Abu Mazin, Abu Ratib, Abu Dujana, and others were political and sometimes militant, as the following lines of Abu Dujanans song “Li-l-lahi qafilatu l-kifah” show:

1. The caravan of Jihad crashes the place of refuge of the wolves
2. We will launch into the crucial battle with our Islam
3. And make the false castles collapse

Some songs by Abu Mazin, like “Bi Jihadina,” are still relevant to the current *jihadist* movement, which use those songs in their videos (see below).

The Syrian *nasheed* singers were not just opposed to the state but also to Sufi groups. Nasir al-Din al-Albani tells that in Damascus—two years before his exile to Jordan in 1979—some “Muslim youth” sang *nasheeds* in opposition to Sufistic singing ritual: “I remember precisely, when I was in Damascus, two years before I came to Amman, some Muslim youth began to sing nasheeds with a flawless meaning. Their aim was to stop the sufi chanting, like the poems by Bushiri and others, and recorded them therefore on cassette.”²³

Many famous *munshids* (*nasheed* singers), like the mentioned Abu Mazin, Abu Ratib, and Abu Dujana, were forced to leave their homeland and go into exile in other Arab states. It stands to reason that they spread their message in the new environment. In Saudi Arabia the exiled Muslimbrotherhood members introduced youth camps where the teenager learned and sung *nasheeds* about the glory of Islam and the liberation of Palestine.²⁴ Interestingly, Osama bin Laden also established a *nasheed* group in the 1970s.²⁵

Besides Egypt and Syria in Palestine another important development took place, which had also influence on poetry and nasheeds: With the Intifada in 1987 Hamas emerged as a political factor and gave the resistance an Islamic face. In the Hamas charter of 1988 it becomes clear that the organization acknowledged *nasheeds* as an instrument for indoctrination and planned to use them for their purposes:

Books articles, newsletters, orations, pamphlets, poetry, *nasheed* (songs), plays and other materials, if the specialties of Islamic art are included in it, are necessary for ideological education and invigorating nourishment to continue the struggle and relaxing the spirit because the struggle is long the toil is hard. The souls will be bored and Islamic art revives the vigor, imparts excitement and invokes in the soul the high spirits and correct deliberation.²⁶

In the late 1980s more and more political–religious *nasheed* groups, like “ash-Shuhada” (the martyrs), occurred and called for Islamic resistance against the occupation. The Islamist songs were widespread and had an impact even on suicide bombers. In an interview the brother of a Hamas suicide bomber tells that his brother used to listen to tapes of Hamas with *nasheeds* “all the time” and that they had a great influence on him.²⁷

Parallel to the events in the Arab world the war in Afghanistan continued. Many Arabs came to the Hindu Kush to fight the Russians. This was the real beginning of the global *jihād* and of Al Qaeda. The record “Caravan of the martyrs” was one of the first *jihād*ist *nasheed* albums that became famous. Today several new editions of this album have been published. The first one included songs about Arabs who lost their lives in Afghanistan between 1987 and 1990. This source is hence a quite important document to reconstruct the history of modern *jihād*ist *nasheeds*. There are also other example songs from Arabs in Afghanistan, like a *nasheed* about the love for Kabul and Afghanistan with the title “Wallahi ya Kabul shauqi ilaik yatul” (By God, my sympathy for you Kabul is constant).²⁸ But Afghanistan was also for Arabs who did not join the *jihād* themselves a source of inspiration for poems and songs as the *nasheed* collections of the 1980s and early ‘90s suggest. The *nasheed* book “Fi zilal as-suyuf” (“under the shadow of swords”) does not only include *nasheeds* about Afghanistan but the author Saif al-Islam Abu al-Fida devotes his work even to the Afghan *jihād* and combines the battle in Afghanistan with the Intifada in Palestine: “To those who sing about the honor of this religion in words and deeds. To the heroic Mujahidin in the squares of Jerusalem and the mountains of Afghanistan as well as in our beloved country [it is not clear to which country Abu al-Fida refers].”²⁹

Another example is Ahmad Muhammad as-Sadiq, who was born in Palestine and was in the first place focused on the conflict with Israel. He is considered as one of the “poets of the Islamic da’wa” and like his fellow poets, as-Sadiq’s interest was not limited to one conflict in the Islamic world alone, so he also wrote about Afghanistan.³⁰ In his *nasheed* collection you will find a song called “Nasheed al-Jihad al-Afghani” that begins with the following lines:³¹

1. We performed the war prayer and our eye did not rest.
2. On the battle field we will not truckle to anyone beside God.
3. Our lions are lying lurking in the mountain side, closed in darkness.
4. In the valley the echo of the attacks resounds so that even the Jinn are surprised in the closeness [of the attacks].

These lines and also the following ones document the optimistic mood of as-Sadiq about the war in Afghanistan. We also find poems with a less optimistic perspective that were written in an effort to encourage the fighters as we find it in a *nasheed* poem by Qasim Shareef, published in 1988.³²

But also the Afghan fighters themselves listened to music. John Baily tells about songs of the *mujahidin* he found in Peshawar in 1985.³³ Those songs were brought to Afghanistan to entertain the warriors. The texts describe the bravery of the fighters and tell about famous battles. Its music is completely different from Arab *nasheeds*. While Arab *nasheeds* are performed a cappella the melodies of Afghan *mujahidin* songs root in the traditional Pashto music and also music instruments are used extensively.³⁴ As the Afghans did not influence the Arabs in this field, it seems that the opposite is true: the melodies of modern Taliban songs still have a traditional root but it is only rudimental. Also, those songs are not accompanied by classical Afghan instruments. All in all, Taliban songs are more similar to Arab *nasheeds* than to Afghan music. From a theoretical point of view the difference in style between Afghan *mujahidin* songs and Taliban songs is alleageable under the perspective of the enemy the two groups were/are fighting. While the *mujahidin* in the 1980s were fighting against the U.S.S.R. and the “godless” communist regime in Kabul the Taliban are fighting against a government that proclaims to be Islamic and a state that is officially an Islamic Republic. Therefore it is much more difficult for the Taliban to distinguish their movement from the values of the current Afghan regime than it was for the *mujahidin*. This implies that the Taliban not only have to use a different language but they also have to set themselves apart in a cultural way.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the 1970s and ‘80s were the prelude to the modern *jihadi* movement and also to the modern *jihadi* culture and songs. Some of the texts of contemporary *nasheeds* can actually be found in songbooks of the 1980s. The song “Fi sabili l-lahi namdi” (We are walking on God’s path *or* We are dying on God’s path) is one example in this context. It is recorded by the famous *jihadi* *munshid* Abu Usaid. In other *nasheeds*, famous Islamist poetry has been used as a textual base for the song. One example is the song “al-Nasheed al-Islami,” which is, among others, used in a video of the “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” (IMU). The poem to this song is originally composed by the famous Pakistani poet Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), who wrote the piece in Urdu.³⁵ It was later translated into Arabic by Sawi Sha’lan, a blind Azhari-Shaikh.³⁶ We find this poem also in many *nasheed* collections of the 1980s.

Another type of texts has been taken from the classical Islamic sources. The *nasheed* “Ya ‘abid al-haramain” (Oh servant of the two sanctuaries) is a sample therefore. The poem is included in Marwan Kajak’s *nasheed* collection of 1982.³⁷ Since then it has been recorded several times in different versions and is still today a very popular *nasheed* in the *jihadi* scene. A famous record for example is made by Tariq Jaber (alias Abu Ziyad) and a live performance can be found in the IMU video “Labbaik.” The text is actually written by ‘Abd Allah Ibn Mubarak (died 797) who wrote it as mockery to Fudail Ibn ‘Iyad. The text is transmitted by Ibn Kathir in his Quran exegesis.³⁸

The historical analysis of Nasheed-texts shows that the *jihadi* culture can be traced back to the 1970s and ‘80s. Many songs used in *jihadi* propaganda today already circulated

at that time in songbooks by poets and collectors, who mostly came from Syria or Egypt and had more ties with the Muslimbrotherhood than the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia. This is an indication for the thesis that the roots of *jihadi* culture possibly lies in the Muslimbrotherhood tradition than in Wahhabism or that it merged the two influences to a unique culture.³⁹ The assumption leads to questions about the Wahhabi and the Muslimbrotherhood stance toward music and *nasheeds*. An attempt to give an answer to this question will be presented in the next section.

The Definition of *Nasheeds* and the Salafi Stance Toward This Genre

When looking at different perspectives among scholars in our context, we have to distinguish between the Saudi state *ulama* (Wahhabis), the independent Salafis, and scholars with ties to the Muslimbrotherhood. Wahhabis and Salafis share a quite similar view on *nasheeds*, which is more or less suspicious. According to Salafi scholar Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, who wrote a comprehensive work on music and Islam, Islamic nasheeds are only allowed, if:

- a) ... the melody is not similar to the teachings of western or eastern music, which make people dance.
- b) ... the text is purely Islamic.
- c) ... there are no musical instruments used, except for the *duff* (which is allowed only for women at weddings).
- d) ... the listening to nasheeds does not distract from the study of the Quran.⁴⁰

Almost similar arguments are found in *fatwas* by important Wahhabi scholars, like Salih al-Fawzan, Muhammad Ibn Salih al-Uthaimeen, Abd Allah Jibreen, or Abd al-Aziz Ibn Baz. A *fatwa* of importance on the issue of *nasheeds* was released by the “Permanent Board for Scientific Research and Legal Opinion” (*al-lajna ad-da’ima li-l-buhuth al-’ilmiya wa-l-ifta’*) in which the leading Wahhabi scholars are represented.⁴¹ According to this legal opinion, *nasheeds* are allowed as alternative to pop music because *nasheeds* arouse in listener and singer obedience to God and refuse evil as they also spread religious enthusiasm. Yet, the *ulama* insist it is important that listening to *nasheeds* does not become a constant preoccupation. It should be performed to special occasions, like weddings or on travels to *jihad*. In any case it would be better to recite the Quran, the *fatwa* advises.

Especially the argument that listening to *nasheeds* could distract from the study and the recitation of the Quran is very common in *fatwa* of the mentioned *ulama*. Furthermore, the argument that the practice of singing *nasheeds* is rooted in Sufism is often used. In his *fatwa* Salih al-Fawzan emphasizes this argument often and says that “they [the Sufis] are making use of it [*nasheeds*] as worship to God” (*yattakhidhuna-hu ‘ibadat l-lah*).⁴² Al-Fawzan divides between *nasheeds* as Sufi songs and *inshad ash-shi’r* (reciting poetry), which he finds can be *mufid* (beneficial) since this has been a habit in times of the prophet Muhammad.⁴³

In the *jihadi* spectrum we find an opinion from Abu Usama ash-Shami, a member of the *Sharia* board of the website tawhed.ws. In *fatwa* no. 443 ash-Shami states that *nasheeds* are permissible (*mubah*), if they are in accordance with some conditions: “There are no objections against listening to nasheeds, if they are free of rhythm, music, drums and [emotional] impact. It is permissible, especially, if the nasheeds are evoking enthusiasm (*hamasa*), like Jihad-nasheeds.”⁴⁴

This statement is in accordance with the view of Ibn Baz, who said that *nasheeds* are permissible if they are calling, among other things, for the defense of the homeland against the maneuver of the enemies.⁴⁵

Summarized, Wahhabis and Salafis tend to take a suspicious stance toward *nasheeds*, because they are afraid that the songs might evoke emotions like music does and that listening to *nasheeds* might distract from studying and listening to the Quran. But they are not regarding *nasheeds* as entirely forbidden (*haram*). Rather, they permit *nasheeds* under some strict conditions. The *jihadis* were definitely influenced by Wahhabis and Salafis in the purist opinion about the form of *nasheeds* and the topics the texts should cover.

On the other hand we do not find a very strict handling of *nasheeds* by *jihadist* activists or organizations. Instead, they are making extensively use of *nasheeds*. An explanation could be found in the history of the *jihadist* movement. As a product of a merging of Salafism and Qutbism the *jihadist* ideology is not pure Salafi. Also the Muslimbrotherhood (MB) had influence on the thoughts and minds of *jihadists*. The MB has got a far more relaxed stance toward music than Salafis have. Qutb is said to have owned a huge collection of LPs in his house in Cairo.⁴⁶ Furthermore al-Albani mentions an article in the MB magazine *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn* in the 1950s that speaks out for an “Islamic music.”⁴⁷ Al-Albani also mentions an article in the same magazine written by Muhammad Abu Zahra, who was a professor at al-Azhar University and had ties with the MB, in which he reveals a very liberal stance towards music.⁴⁸ This attitude of the MB you will also find by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who is also considered as one of the “poets of the Islamic *da’wa*” and was called among his companions “Yusuf the poet.”⁴⁹ He regards music as allowed under some restrictions, which he explains in “The lawful and the forbidden in Islam.”⁵⁰ Here he states: “Singing is one of the means of entertainment that may comfort the soul, please the heart, and refresh the ear. Islam permits singing under the condition that it not be in any way obscene or harmful to Islamic morals.”⁵¹

In 2001 al-Qaradawi even published a whole book about singing, music, and Islam called “*Fiqh al-ghina’ wa-l-musiqa fi dhau al-Quran wa-s-sunna*.” Here he reveals that some scholars misunderstood his earlier words and interpreted that he allows music and singing in general. This, al-Qaradawi says further, is not the case. He draws a line between secular and religious singing and considers *nasheeds* as part of the latter.⁵² *Nasheeds* are allowed because they encourage “the decidedness of the heroes for Jihad and war and incite to cohesiveness towards the martyrdom.”⁵³

Also, the political background and the regional origin of most authors of early *nasheed* texts—almost all of them can be subsumed under the so-called poems of the Islamic *da’wa*—indicate that they had more often a Muslim brotherhood background than a Wahhabi one. Given the fact that some of their texts are still in use by terrorist organization it seems that Al Qaeda and similar groups adopted the tradition of *nasheed* singing by the Muslimbrotherhood and likewise groups rather than by Saudi Wahhabism. This conclusion is based on the analysis of the literature I accessed. But also people to whom I spoke in Saudi Arabia told me that *nasheeds* are not an original Saudi tradition. It appears that *nasheeds* were imported to Saudi Arabia in the nearby past. An evidence for this thesis are the aforementioned youth camps in Saudi Arabia that were imported by exiled Muslimbrother members.⁵⁴ Furthermore Saif al-Islam Abu al-Fida is confirming the impression of a late arrival of the *nasheeds* on the Arabian Peninsula. He writes:

The Arabian Peninsula in this ninth decade is experiencing an islamic renaissance, which is infiltrating many areas. The islamic nasheeds played their active role in supporting this renaissance. We got aware of that by the increase of audio stores, specialised on islamic nasheeds. (. . .) Since it was made possible for us to live in the Gulf region we see the interest of girls and boys about the texts of the nasheeds and they ask for nasheed books.⁵⁵

Examples for Different Types of *Nasheeds*

As aforementioned, we find four major categories in which most of the analyzed nasheeds fit. The vast majority of *nasheeds* can be subsumed under “battle hymns.” These songs are committed to fighting and used to encourage and mobilize the warriors and their supporters. It is not surprising to find the majority of *nasheeds* in this category when we look at studies that evaluate other *jihadi* publications like videos. Cecilie Finsnes came to the conclusion that 48 percent of all *jihadi* film productions serve the interest to document battles and attacks.⁵⁶ This impression is approximately roughly true for *jihadist nasheeds*.⁵⁷

The texts in this category deal with struggle to recover a lost dignity and a lost freedom. They also tell about the heroism of their own fighters, who are not afraid of anything but God.⁵⁸ To this group attributes like “lion” (*hizabr/hizbar*, *asad*, or *laith*) are applied. In contrast to this the enemy is described as a tyrant (*taghut*) who is godless and cruel so that the whole struggle becomes a war between good and evil or truth/justice (*haqq*) and injustice (*zulm*).

One of the most popular songs in this context is “Bi jihadina” (With our Jihad). Originally it was sung by the Syrian Abu Mazin. We find the complete text in the songbook “Nashid al-kata’ib” from 1984.⁵⁹ The song, newly interpreted by the famous Saudi *nasheed* singer Abu ‘Ali, is used in many different videos by diverse organizations, like “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” or “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib.” The poem fulfills the requirements of the classical Arabic poetry and is written in a Kamil meter. In the text we find most of the described features of battle hymns:

1. With our *jihad* we crumble rocks and tear the tyrants and the unbelieve limb from limb.
2. With a mighty and great decisiveness and a rigid volition.
3. We mobilize the emotions and the thoughts. With our blood we will color the dawn.
4. Oh my *umma*, we are searching for it as victory. With our struggle we will change the course of history.
5. With our *jihad*, with a looming torch the night of *shirk* and godlessness (*ilhad*) will disappear.
6. We will engage brave with decisiveness and struggle and break the tyranny of chains and bonds.

Another important sort of *nasheeds* are songs about martyrs (*shuhada*). Those songs are related to martyrdom, but they usually are not dedicated to a single person but to the idea of martyrdom itself. There are some exceptions like the old and famous song “Ya Shahid” by Abu Mazin, which is devoted to Sayyid Qutb.⁶⁰ But most and foremost martyr *nasheeds* are not personalized. “Zuffu sh-shahid” is a very interesting example for this kind of song. It has been used among others in an IMU video named “Der kompromisslose Bräutigam” (The uncompromising groom), which deals with the martyrdom of a man called “Farooq al-Almani,” who is said to have conducted a suicide attack in Kunduz against the local CIA bureau. The poem to the song is written by the Syrian Marwan Hadid who was the founder and leader of the militant group “Fighting Vanguard.”⁶¹ Hadid was not only a commander but also a poet and left a complete Diwan with many poets regarding martyrdom and he also is considered to be one of the “poets of the Islamic *da’wa*.”⁶² The here-analyzed poem is typical for his work. It describes the joy of the paradise for the *shahid* and encourages not giving up the fight against the oppressors. Many phrases Hadid used—for example, “We will not submit to any ruler and we will not knuckle down”—are very common in *jihadist*

poetry. Due to the poem's length (it contains 13 verses), only a few will be translated here to give a sense of its message:

1. The *huris* are calling out of joy: "Get us the broom for marriage!" The *huris* reject to get married to a dumb one.
2. The gardens of Eden are opening its wideness only to the martyr, who will be rewarded for his good deeds.
3. We sacrifice our souls for the religion and its prophet. The religion will be victorious by sword and blood.
4. We will not submit to any ruler and we will not knuckle down. With unbelief he condemns the people to slavery. (...)
5. We will purify the earth, which has been sold by its rulers, from all oppressors. (...)
6. We will not be satisfied with our lives, if it does not include dignity and if the free man does not achieve, what he wants.

Yet another important category are mourning songs (*marthiyar/riṭha'*).⁶³ The *marthiya* is a very old sort of poetry in the Arab world that had been composed for friends and relatives, persons of high standing and sometimes even for animals or nonliving objects.⁶⁴ In difference to martyr *nasheeds*, mourning hymns are dedicated to a special person. The genre survived from the days of the ancient Arabs until today and is also used by the *jihadist* movement. The aforementioned compilation "Caravan of the martyrs" from the early 1990s includes the first known mourning songs within the *jihadi* context. One example from this album is the song "*Wa mada Shafiq*" (Shafiq has passed away). The following lines give an impression of the affectionate description of the man called "Shafiq":

1. Shafiq has passed away from us, like a falling star which is glimpsing quickly and went along his way.
2. Like a twinkling star which filled heaven with its shining. Like a singing nightingale which has returned to its singing and whistling.
3. Like a tender rivulet which purling sound fills the heart with melancholy. And Shafiq has passed away.
4. I do not know how to live after him or how to forget the passed away one or how to forget his face.

A newer and very interesting *riṭha'*-compilation is found in the album "Ma'a al-khalidin" (With the immortals), produced by Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and released in October 2010. The album contains seven songs about killed AQAP members. Some of them can be identified: "Fata l-fityan" (Best of all young man), for example, describes 'Abd Allah Hassan Ibn al-'Asiri who conducted a suicide bombing on the Saudi prince and assistant minister of interior Muhammad Bin Nayef Bin 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Saud on 27 August 2009. Like all the other included poems "Fata l-fityan" is a qualitative high-class poem that corresponds with the requirements of the classical Arabic poetry. There are some poems on the record "Ma'a al-khalidin" that are not very personalized, so that the described person could be everyone. But "Fata l-fityan" gives the dead person individuality and gives the feeling, that someone who knew al-'Asiri well wrote this piece. Here are some fragments of the text:

1. You are the best of all young men, Oh Ibn al-'Asiri. I would sacrifice myself for you. But that would be less compared to the many [deeds you gave].
2. May good care for you as you are a noble and brave person. You met death with a clear conscience. (...)

3. You pressed the button⁶⁵ while preaching goodwill to us. In complete trust in God. (. . .)
4. I experienced you fasting day after day. The night you stayed awake [in praying] with a grateful heart.
5. A content soul with a noble character. Tirelessly helpful to the comrades.
6. May God have mercy with the young man al-'Asiri and wed him with the *huris*.
7. And lead him to the gardens without judgment, side by side with the chosen one, the guiding one, the deliverer of the message of joy [the prophet Muhammad].

The last main category of *nasheeds* are praising songs. Poems praising a high-standing person are a known type of Arab poetry and called *madih* (praise).⁶⁶ The *madih* is often included in other forms of poetry, for example in the mourning lyric. The character of the praised one (*mamduh*) is described in stereotypical ways. The most common attributes, which are similar to the features given in self-praising poetry (*fakhr*), are generosity, bravery, and honor. Those elements are found almost in every praising hymn in the *jihadist* context, in which the *mamduh* is equal to important commanders and leaders, like Abu Musab az-Zarqawi or Osama bin Laden. For the latter the song "Na'am Usama" (Yes Usama) has been composed.⁶⁷ It is said that his son in law Sulaiman Abu Ghaith was the author of the poem.⁶⁸ The song is a mixture of *madih* and *fakhr*, which is a typical combination in classical Arabic poetry. Only the title, the first four and the last two lines of a total of eleven verses are dedicated to bin Laden explicitly. Other verses deal with the enemy and the bravery of the own group, who is fighting the oppressors. The words at the end of each verse rhyme with "Osama," which is a clear evidence, that he is the main topic in this poem. Also the *nasheed* is referred to as "qasida fi madh ash-shaikh Usama Bin Laden" (poet in praise for the Shaikh Osama bin Laden).

Interestingly the poem is not entirely written in one meter. In approximately 90 percent the meter "ramal" was used. As one example the meter changes in between the first and second hemistich from "ramal" into "kamil," which is quite unusual.

The first four verses are given here as an example of praising literature:

1. How excellent you are, oh Usama! On the forehead of honor you are a beauty mark.
2. Towering between us, not bowing his head to the oppressors.
3. He taught the tyrants a lesson and pulls out his sword against them.
4. Booming the voice declares: "The unbelief has got no integrity."

It is noteworthy to mention that many very specific phrases used in the poem can be found also in the work of the Iraqi poet Walid al-'Azami who was born in 1930 in the Iraqi town of al-'Azam.⁶⁹ One example can be found in line three of "Na'am Usama": "He taught the tyrants a lesson (laqqana l-baghina darsan)" In al-'Azami's "Nashid Umman" it is written: "laqqana l-kafira darsan."⁷⁰ Other similarities, as the use of the quite uncommon word "ta'ta'a" (to bow the head) lead to the assumption that it is at least possible that Abu Ghaith borrowed some ideas by al-'Azami that would not be too surprising, given al-'Azami's high standing in the Islamist poetry.

A clearer *madih* than in "Na'am Usama" the last poet we find in a poem in praise to Samir Salih 'Abd Allah al-Suwailam, known as "Saif al-Islam Khattab" or "Commander Khattab."⁷¹ From Saudi origin Khattab was the most important foreign commander in the first Chechnya war (1994–1996). The poem is a pure praise of his person. Unlike the other here-given examples its style is not neo-classical but free-verse, hence there is no usage of one of the classical meters, the monorhyme or two equal hemistichs (*misra'* or *shatr*). The here-given sample of verses is sufficient to understand the main message of the song:⁷²

1. Sword of Islam, symbol of boldness.
2. When the battle is initiated, he appears as a lion.
3. Are you aware who this courageous man is? Khattab!
4. This is Khattab, like a pouncing lion.
5. Arouse admiration, oh lion of the wilderness.
6. The cannon sings the melody: Khattab!
7. A magnificent voice calling the freemen: Confront the infidels, the inhabitants of the [hell-] fire.

Here again we do not find Khattab described as a generous man or from noble lineage, like it was common in ancient Arab poetry. The poem strictly focuses on his bravery on the battlefield, which was apparently his most striking attribute. In contrast to this, verse 12 of the AQAP-*marthiya* “Ala ya lail” (Oh night) gives an example of a typical *madih* attribute: *He is a supporter of the widows or the relatives and against the orphans his hands are widely open.*

Conclusion

1. The tradition of *nasheeds* is clearly not a Saudi one. Rather, it seems to originate from a Muslimbrotherhood-influenced culture in the 1970s and ‘80s. The poems of the *nasheeds* are sometimes even older but nonetheless recent. Only some texts are borrowed from historical Islamic sources. From the Wahhabis the *jihadists* learned the purist view on singing, which is the reason for the strictly vocal performances of modern *jihadi* songs. Although the texts of the *nasheeds* are often the same for thirty or more years the musical interpretation has changed. While Abu Mazins songs and even more songs from Palestine where often accompanied by drums and had a more “musical” character, current *jihadist nasheeds* are strictly performed without drums or any other music instruments.

The contents of the song texts are limited to a core of statements and vocabulary that is relatively constant approximately since the early 1970s and 1980s, which tells us also about the stagnation of the militant Islamist project and its lack in originality. The main attempt of the texts is to portray their own fight as a legitimate struggle against the tyrannical oppressors and as a struggle in accordance with the will of God. This allows speaking of a sort of “resistance literature” as Barbara Harlow described it for freedom movements in developing countries.⁷³ The Islamist poets promise to establish a just order for society in accordance with the rulings of God in place of the ruling godless injustice. Hereby *nasheeds*, as a cultural product, are reflecting the militant Islamist ideology as Qutb and others developed it. An omnipresent wish in many texts is the desire to reestablish honor and dignity of the *umma*. This backlooking character reflects a certain deficit of self-confidence and a cultural pessimism. A finding Emmanuel Sivan noticed in his study about radical Islamism in the late 1970s and early ‘80s is: “The twentieth century . . . has been particularly hard on Muslim self-esteem. A civilization that had always viewed itself as destined for leadership suffered one setback after the other at the hands of infidels who now set the pace in all realms of human activity.”⁷⁴

The positive bench mark in history for the *jihadist* is the early Islamic community. With those times the *jihadist* poets try to tie in by using an archaic and ancient language. There are single words in the poems like “*hizabr/hizbar*” (lion), which are very out of use in contemporary Arabic or the usage, and also complete phrases

like “cup of death,” which is used in old poems as well as in *jihadist* lyrics. The poets not only want to tie in with glorious times but they also want to distance themselves from the average Arab society, which is another reason for using an old-fashioned language.

2. The militant Islamists’ poetry has got some common attributes with the anti-colonial and neo-classical *qaseeda*. This is to say the usage of the old vocabulary and phrases and the application of the criteria of the classical-like monometer and monorhyme and the division into two equal hemistichs. Besides these formal criteria we find more similarities between the genres in respect to aspects of identity. Shmuel Moreh wrote about the neoclassical *qaseeda*:

The return to classical Arabic sources seems to have been inevitable especially among Muslim poets and writers not only because it suited admirably the poetry of the court and of religious and national revival . . . but also to emphasize their cultural identity by recalling its glorious and profound classical heritage. This seemed to them the best answer to the alien European literature and the invading and aggressive Christian civilization of the West.⁷⁵

This conclusion in great measure is also guilty for the *jihadist* poetry, which is clearly an expression of religious revival and Arab national pride. It is written to define an identity in distance to Western social and political concepts.

But while the authors of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have written their poems “in opposition to colonialism”⁷⁶ the modern “poets of the Islamic *da’wa*” in the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s and their successors, the *jihadist* poets, wrote from a post-colonial perspective in which the main enemy is in most cases not a foreign power but one’s own or another Arab government. The situation in Iraq or Afghanistan,⁷⁷ where foreign forces occupy the country, is of course a different one. Pieslak did some work on specific Iraqi *nasheeds*, like the popular song “Lions of Falujah,” which reflect the struggle against a foreign occupier.⁷⁸

So, in conclusion you can say that from a literary point of view, many *nasheed* poems can be viewed as modified extension of the neo-classical and anti-colonial *qaseeda*.

3. *Nasheeds* are an effective instrument for propaganda. It is not just appealing to the reason via its texts but it is also affecting the soul. The former AQAP member and editor of the online magazine “Inspire,” Samir Khan, who was killed in a drone strike at the end of 2011, made the following remarks about the effects of listening to *nasheeds*:

I remember when I traveled from San’a, for what seemed like years, in a car to one of the bases of the mujahidin, the driver played this one *nashīd* repeatedly. It was “Sir ya bin Ladin.” I already knew of this *nashīd* from before, but something had struck me at that moment. The *nashīd* repeated lines pertaining to fight the tyrants of the world for the purpose of giving victory to the Islamic nation. But it also reminded the listener that Shaykh Usama bin Ladin is the leader of this global fight. I looked out of the window at the tall mud houses below the beautiful sky and closed my eyes as the wind blew through my hair.⁷⁹

There are no comparable descriptions known to the author, whether in Arabic or other languages, which would give a better and more impressive inside look at how *nasheeds* affect the individual and mobilize the emotions.

Nasheeds are very widespread through the Internet, so that not only adherents of the *jihadist* movements but also their sympathizers can get in touch with this material easily because you will find many hard-core *nasheeds* not exclusively on *jihadist* websites but also on sites that claim to provide “Islamic *nasheeds*.” By those websites people can come in touch with this material, which can, in combination with other factors, radicalize individuals on a rational and emotional level.

The songs are furthermore used as a connecting tie between the global *jihadist* scene to which they are helpful in creating a common narrative and building up a collective historical mind.

Notes

1. Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism. Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 24–27; Jarret Brachman, *Global Jihadism—Theory and Practice* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 11 f; Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29(3) (2006), pp. 207–239.

2. Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2004), p. 178.

3. Thomas Bauer, “Die Poesie des Terrorismus,” in Andreas K. W. Meayer, ed., *Siebenjahrbuch Deutsche Oper Berlin MMIV–MMXI* (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2011), pp. 123–127, at p. 125. Empirical studies are underlining the above given assumption: Cf., for example, Saskia Lützing, *Die Sicht des Anderen. Eine qualitative Studie zu Biographien von Extremisten und Terroristen* (Köln: Luchterhand, 2010).

4. Bauer, “Die Poesie des Terrorismus,” p. 125.

5. Anwar al-Awlaki, *44 Ways to Support Jihad* (Victorious Media), p. 19.

6. Shabaka Ansar al-Mujahideen Forum. Available at <http://202.71.103.132/vb/showthread.php?t=42465&page=3> (accessed 21 January 2012).

7. Tilman Seidensticker, “Jihad Hymns (Nashīds) as a Means of Self-Motivation in the Hamburg Group,” in Hans G. Kippenberg and Tilman Seidensticker, eds., *The 9/11 Handbook. Annotated Translation and Interpretation of the Attacker's Spiritual Manual* (London/Oakville: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 71–78.

8. Seidensticker, “Jihad Hymns (Nashīds) as a Means of Self-Motivation in the Hamburg Group,” p. 73.

9. Rüdiger Lohker, *Dschihadismus—Materialien* (Wien: Facultas Verlags- und Buchhandel, 2009), pp. 133–141.

10. Jonathan Pieslak, *Sound Targets: American Soldiers and Music in the Iraq War* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 58–77.

11. In the nearby future Nelly Lahoud and Jonathan Pieslak will publish their interesting and helpful works about *nasheeds* for “Jihad culture” edited by Thomas Hegghammer (Cambridge University Press). The perspective of those articles will differ from the here presented work.

12. There are some arguments to consider Palestine hymns as a category of its own: Songs about Palestine are actually numerous, they are widespread in the Internet, and you find them also in comprehensive *nasheed* collections on *jihadist* websites and in songbooks from the 1980s. The reasons why those songs are not listed as their own type in the *jihadist* context is that they are not specifically *jihadist* in style and content and in only a few cases have they been used as a soundtrack for *jihadis* videos. So you can say that Palestine hymns are clearly a sort of their own, but not in the *jihadist* context for which it is of minor interest.

13. Cf. Muhammad Mustafa Badawi, introduction to *An Anthology of Modern Arabic Verse* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. ix–xi; Hussein Kadhim, introduction to *The Poetics*

of *Anti-Colonialism in the Arabic Qasīdah* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. x. Shmuel Moreh, “The Neo-classical Qasīdah—Modern Poets and Critics,” in G. E. Grunebaum, ed., *Arabic Poetry—Theory and Development* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1973), pp. 155–179, at p. 155.

14. Muhammad Mustafa Badawi, *A Critical Introduction to Modern Arabic Poetry* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 15.

15. Kadhim, introduction to *The Poetics of Anti-Colonialism*, p. x.

16. Hereby I want to express my gratitude toward the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, which gave me the opportunity to use its comprehensive library.

17. Many *nasheeds* used in terrorist organization videos have been collected and screened. From this material 25 songs have been analyzed systematically in accordance to the above-given criteria. Thus this study is based on a qualitative and not quantitative approach.

18. Immanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 3–6.

19. Charles Hirschkind, *The Ethical Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 127.

20. Husni Adham Jarar and Ahmad Abd al-Latif al-Jada, ed., *Anashid ad-da'wa al-islamiya*, Vol. 1 (Amman: ad-Dar Amar, 1984), p. 9 f.

21. Marwan Kajak, *Anashid islamiya* (Kuwait: Dār al-Arḡam, 1982), p. 5.

22. Homepage of Abu Ratib. Available at www.aburatib.com/content/view/127/113/lang/ar/ (accessed 16 July 2011).

23. Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, *Tahrim Alat at-Tarab*, fourth edition (Maktaba al-Dalil, 1997), p. 181.

24. Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam. The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 50.

25. Lawrence Wright, *Der Tod wird euch finden. eda und der Weg zum 11. September* (München: Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, 2007), p. 109.

26. Muhammad Maqdisi, “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22(4) (1993), pp. 122–134, at p. 128.

27. Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, *The Road to Martyrs' Square. A Journey into the World of the Suicide Bomber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 163.

28. Muslm.net Forum. Available at <http://www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=351413> and Jihad Archive. Available at http://jarchive.net/details.php?item_id=3750 (both accessed 28 November 2011).

29. Saif al-Islam Abu al-Fida, *Fi zilal as-suyuf—Majmua min al-anashid al-islamiya al-mukhtara* (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazim, 1990), p. 5.

30. More information on as-Sadiq is given in Husni Adham Jarar and Ahmad Latif al-Jada, vol. 1 of *Shu'ara ad-da'wa al-islamiya* (Amman: ad-Dar Amar, 1978), pp. 51–56.

31. Ahmad Muhammad as-Sadiq, *Anashid li-s-sahwa al-islamiya* (Amman: Dar ad-diya li-n-nashr wa-t-tauzi', 1985), pp. 57–61.

32. Qasim Shareef, *Min janib az-zur anashid wa-qasa'id islamiya* (Mekka: Dar bait al-Maqdis and Dar al-manara, 1988), p. 45 ff.

33. John Baily, “Music and Censorship in Afghanistan, 1973–2003,” in Laudan Nooshin, ed., *Music and the Play of Power: Music, Politics and Ideology in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia* (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2009), pp. 143–163, at p. 151.

34. Hereby I want to thank Prof. John Baily who was kind enough to send me copies from the Peshawar cassettes.

35. Iqbal named his poem “Tarana-i Milli” (national anthem). Cf. Abdul Qadir, Iqbal, *The Great Poet of Islam* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1975), p. 80.

36. Ralph M. Coury, *The Making of an Egyptian Nationalist: The Early Years of Azzam Pasha, 1893–1936* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), p. 351.

37. Kajak, *Anashid Islamiya*, p. 112.

38. Ibn Kathir, vol. 1 of *Tafsir al-Quran al-'Azim*, 1st edition (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-'Ilmiya, 1994), p. 412.

39. For the emergence of *jihadism* see David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi-Arabia* (London: Tauris, 2006) and Guido Steinberg, *Der nahe und der ferne Feind—Die Netzwerke des islamistischen Terrorismus* (München: C.H. Beck, 2005).
40. al-Albani, *Tahrim Alat at-Tarab*, p. 181 f.
41. *Fatwa* no. 3259 from 1980 included in Khalid Bin Abd ar-Rahman al-Jarisi, *Fatwa 'ulama' al-balad al-haram* (ar-Riyadh: Mu'assasa li-t-tauzi' wa-l-'ilan, 2011), p. 1567 f.; and as-Sulaimani, al-Bayan al-mufid, pp. 85–87.
42. Salih al-Fawzan about *nasheeds*. Available at majles.alukah.net/showthread.php?88267 (accessed 21 January 2012).
43. *Ibid.*
44. Available at http://tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=443&text=%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%AF&page=1&in=all&submit=%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB (accessed 16 July 2011).
45. Abd al-Aziz Abd Allah Ibn Baz, vol. 3 of *Majmu' al-Fatawa wa Maqalat Mutanwwi'a: al-Tauhid wa ma Yata'llaq bihi*, www.binbaz.org.sa/book/m003.doc, p. 438 (accessed 18 October 2012).
46. Wright, *Der Tod wird euch finden*, p. 42 f.
47. al-Albani, *Tahrim Alat at-Tarab*, p. 15.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
49. Jarar and al-Jada, vol. 3 of *shu'ara ad-da'wa*, p. 11.
50. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam* (Kairo: Al-Falah Foundation for Translation, Publication & Distribution, 1997).
51. *Ibid.*, p. 296.
52. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-ghina' wa-l-musiqa fi dhau al-Quran wa-s-sunna* (Kairo: Maktaba Wahba, 2001), pp. 195–229.
53. al-Qaradawi, *Fiqh al-ghina' wa-l-musiqa*, p. 227.
54. Lacroix, *Awakening Islam*, p. 50.
55. Abu al-Fida, *Fi zilal as-suyuf—Majmua min al-anashid al-islamiya al mukhtara*, p. 7.
56. Cecilie Finsnes, *What is Audio-Visual Jihadi Propaganda? An Overview of the Content of FFI's Jihadi Video Database*, online publication, ed. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Oslo 26 March 2010), <http://rapporter.ffi.no/rapporter/2010/00960.pdf>, p. 19 (accessed 18 October 2012).
57. This assertion is not based on a statistic, but subjective impression. For an empiric conclusion you would have to analyze only one *nasheed* collection and the finding would be valid only for this specific collection. Within a research institute with a team of analysts it would be presumably possible to collect and evaluate all the available *jihad nasheeds*.
58. The self-praise is common in the Arabic poetry, where it is known as *fakhr*.
59. Anonymous, *Nashid al-kata'ib—Majmu' anashid Abu Mazin kamila ma'a tarajim li-shu'ara ad-da'wa* (al-Mansurah: Dar al-wafa' li-t-taba' wa-n-nashr, 1984), p. 181.
60. Anonymous, *Nasheed al-kata'ib*, p. 126.
61. Sivan, *Radical Islam*, p. 114.
62. Jarar and al-Jada, vol. 5 of *shu'ara ad-da'wa*, pp. 95–97.
63. Ch. Pellat, Art. "Marthiya," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. Vol. VI (Leiden: Brill, 1991), pp. 602–608.
64. Ewald Wagner, vol. 1 of *Grundzüge der klassischen arabischen Dichtung. Die altarabische Dichtung*. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 116–134.
65. The button of your explosive device.
66. Wagner, *Grundzüge*, pp. 112–114.
67. The poem is also popular under the name "Li-l-lahi darruk ya Usama."
68. Information about Sulaiman Abu Ghaith as author of the *nasheed* is available at <http://tawhed.ws/c?i=175> (accessed 11 July 2011).
69. Jarar and al-Jada, vol. 5 of *shu'ara ad-da'wa*, p. 5.

70. Walid al-'Azami, *Aghani al-Ma'raka. al-Maktab al-Islami* (Beirut: al-Maktab al-islami, 1987), p. 59.
71. See the biography *ath-Thamar al-mustatat fi sirat al-qa'id Khattab*. No author, year or place given. See also the biographical movie "Saif al-Islam Khattab", produced by Shabaka wa-Islamah al-Ikhbariya.
72. The English translation for this song is available on the Internet.
73. Barbara Harlow, *Resistance Literature* (New York: Methuen, 1987).
74. Sivan, *Radical Islam*, p. 65.
75. Moreh, "The Neoclassical Qasida," p. 156.
76. Kadhim, introduction to *The Poetics of Anti-Colonialism*, p. x.
77. Afghanistan of course is not an Arab country but since the Afghan–Soviet war it has gained importance for the militant Arab Islamists.
78. Pieslak, *Sound Targets*, 2009.
79. Samir Khan, "I am Proud to be a Traitor to America," *Inspire* No. 2, Fall 1431/2010, pp. 45–49; at p. 47.