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The Meaning of Religion and Identity for the Violent Radicalisation of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany

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In the following article, factors with an effect on the radical practice of religion in diaspora communities will be examined. Three factors play a major role in the religious radicalisation of the Islamic diaspora, often referred to as Islamism or religious activism: 1. The Islamist movement in the home country of the immigrants, 2. The situation created by immigration in which religion fulfils functions beyond purely spiritual needs and 3. A personal crisis resulting in individuals being receptive to extremist ideas. After a short conceptual explanation, the development of the Islamist movement in Turkey, which had a strong impact on the diaspora communities, will be traced. Following that, the role of religion for first- and second-generation immigrants will be discussed and individual crisis situations that aid extremism and violent radicalisation will be looked at. The conclusion drawn here allows statements to be made with regard to future tendencies towards violent radicalisation and their religious embedding.

Keywords diaspora, Germany, Islamism, radicalisation, religion, terrorism, Turkey

Since potential extremist suicide bombers from the second and third generation of Muslim immigrants have begun to recruit Europe-wide, increasingly more people are wondering whether there is a connection between these people's religion and the resulting potential for violent radicalisation that arises in our Western societies. After all, Islam is the fastest growing religion in Europe, even though, when looking at a total population of approximately half-a-billion non-Muslims in Europe, the 13.5 million Muslims make up only a small minority.¹

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Islamist Activism (Islamism)

Islamist activism is the active promotion of Islamic dogma, regulations, laws, or political programmes.² It is mostly seen as equivalent to Islamism or radical Islam. There is often talk of a dichotomy between moderate Islam, which represents a matter of individual devoutness to its followers, and Islamism or political Islam, which describes the political engagement of a minority of agitators, who use the belief of their fellow Muslims for political purposes, causing resentment and creating problems for Western interests as well as for “friendly” Muslim states. However, this dichotomy is foreign to Islam. Islam is a religion based on laws and in this regard much closer to Judaism than to Christianity. As such a political dimension is inherent to Islam. It is not quite right to dismiss the belief of Muslims as a private matter, because for the majority of believers, Islam is mainly a public matter that not only postulates a community of believers (the *Ummah*) but also contains a corpus of legal and moral regulations and thereby constitutes the idea of a social order.³ For the majority of practising Muslims there is at least a latent open-mindedness towards activist minorities that would like to see religious regulations reflected in social norms, laws, and also in the type of government governing the states they live in.⁴

When distinguishing between moderate and political Islam, particularly with regard to the influence of Islamist movements on diaspora communities, the most important criteria differentiating forms of Islamist activism is not the relative militancy with which the beliefs are held but the concrete strategy for solution being pursued. This is often overlooked. The following typology of Islamist movements and organisations is in accordance with the definitions given by the International Crisis Group.⁵

*Political Islam*⁶ describes Islamist political movements as represented by the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and its offshoots in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Palestine, Sudan, and Syria or by national movements such as the Turkish Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) and its predecessors and the Party for Justice and Development (*Parti pour la Justice et le Développement*, PJD) in Morocco. It is their goal to attain political power at a national level. It is not the state but society which is to be Islamicised. These movements generally accept the nation-state, operate within its constitutional framework, eschew violence,⁷ pursue a rather reformist religious vision, and invoke universal democratic norms. Political action takes precedence over religious conversion or the use of violence and the religious political movement is mostly organised within political parties.

Missionary Islamism is described as the Islamic mission to convert (*al Da'wa*), which exists in two main variants, exemplified by the highly structured Indian Tablighi movement and the highly diffuse Salafiyya that has its origin in Saudi Arabia and is now globally active with a presence in South East Asia and also increasingly in Europe. Neither of them usually strives for political power or the organisation of parties. The overriding purpose of the movements is the strengthening of the Muslim identity, Islamic faith, and the moral order of Islam against the forces of unbelief. The conversion takes place either as speeches (*al-Da'wa*), strengthening and revitalising the religion (*al-Iman*) and moral order, or in the solidarity of the religious community (*al-Umma*).

The third type, *Jihadi Islamism*, describes the Islamic armed fight (*al-Jihād*),⁸ which is supported by activists propagating and using violence. These individuals

consider themselves to be military defenders of the Dar al-Islam (the “House of Islam,” the region that was historically subject to Islamic rule) and the *Ummah* against faithless enemies. Two religious movements can be differentiated: a. the so-called *Jihadi Salafiyya* (*al-Salafiyya al-jihâdiyya*), consisting of radicalised Salafis who have left the path of non-violent activism (*Da'wa*) and political Islam to commit themselves to the armed Jihad,⁹ and b. so-called Qutb followers (*al-Qutbiyyin*). These are activists influenced by the extremist ideas of the Egyptian Muslim Brother Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). They first led their Jihad against the “close enemy,” that is, against local regimes disparaged as sinful (*kufr*), particularly Egypt. Later the fight was extended to the global Jihad against the “distant enemy,” that is, Israel and the West, particularly the USA.¹⁰ Over the last fifteen years these two Jihadi movements have mutually influenced each other. Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network, for example, represents a synthesis of Jihad-Salafi and Qutbist elements.

These varieties of Sunni-Islamic activism¹¹ are attempts to combine tradition and modernity in order to maintain aspects of religious tradition. It has to be emphasised that *political movements* like the Muslim Brotherhood or the Turkish AKP represent the least extremist versions. They take the acceptance of democratic norms and principles that were, until now, avoided as non-Islamic the furthest. They also take a modernist attitude towards Islamic law. Purely religious and missionary Islamists, in contrast, tend to radicalise quickly in conflict situations. As they lack, or have been put off, any experience with the political system and any inclination towards political activism, they choose armed Jihad more readily.

Religious Movements in Turkey

The situation for radical Islamist immigrants cannot be examined separately from their countries of origin.¹² Turkish Muslims cannot complain about colonisation by European forces, in contrast to many North African countries, home to most immigrants in France, Italy, and Spain, or the Indian subcontinent, home to the majority of immigrants in the UK. Considering its own imperialist history as the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has never known the humiliating experience of suppression and exploitation that could serve as a historic pattern for framing and interpretation of current experiences of discrimination.

Even though, in the Islamist discourse, Turkey in the 19th century is described as a pawn in European power games; secularisation as a consequence of the failure of the Ottoman Empire was an independent Turkish development.¹³ In the early stages of *Kemalism*, Islam was seen as a potential danger for the modern nation-state, but, at the same time, it played a unifying role allowing the Turkish nation to emerge from the multicultural mix of the Ottoman rump state.¹⁴ Therefore Islam kept its meaning, regardless of the anti-religious step taken by the early republic that defined Westernisation as modernisation and disparaged Islam as antiquated. That is why, although Islam in Turkey was exposed to multiple repressions from the state, and is still today not completely free in its development, the religion remained firmly rooted, particularly amongst the rural population, and was never completely eliminated.¹⁵

Later Turkish laity took over the organisation and control of religion to limit its influence. General religious education was introduced, pilgrimage was allowed, and the training of theologians and preachers was supported. The repressive religious

politics practised until then had strengthened religious authorities outside the control of the state rather than weakening religious ties.¹⁶ Since the 1950s the Kemalist state itself became an important player in the Islamic landscape, by subjecting questions of faith and the religious cult to the state-controlled Department of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi*, short: *Diyanet*).¹⁷

In the mid-1970s, the whole Islamic world experienced a change of thought with regard to the relation between religion and society, and those schools of thought that did not want to adjust religion to modernity, but rather to create a religious modernity gained new influence. This change took place after the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973 and the following oil crisis.¹⁸ Societal progress, as the legitimating ideology of secular modernity, proved to be brittle and voices articulating unease with secular modernity and the question of societal identity were raised again.¹⁹ The leaders and many followers of this new, Islamist religious movement in Turkey were still affected by modernity. They often held a degree, mainly in technical or medical subjects, and many of them were children of immigrants from rural areas who had gone through state education. Particularly characteristic of this movement was a new religious, and, at the same time, modern self-confidence amongst its followers. In 1970, the first party formed out of the non-state Islamic movement in Turkey, which was quickly prohibited due to a breach of the principle of secularity.²⁰ However, new Islamist parties continued to form.²¹ In the early 70s the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*), founded by Necmettin Erbakan from this new religious movement, won many votes particularly in rural areas. On its periphery the first Islamist groups emerged gearing towards Islamic state models. They did not want to achieve a more Islamic Turkey, but rather a completely new state order. Again, though, a change of paradigm took place “from the top down” in the relation between state and religion. The military coup on 12 September 1980 introduced the ideological concept of the TIS (*Türk İslam Sentezi*/Turkish-Islamic synthesis) in order to fight left- and right-wing extremist tendencies and the emerging political Islam. TIS was a vision that combined Turkish nationalism and Kemalist ideas of a strong state with a moderate and anti-Communist view of Islam. “The emerging Sunni Islam that is also preached by state politics was the paradoxical consequence of the Turkish laity.”²²

Economic growth and political and economic liberalisation after the military coup of 1980 strengthened Islamist politics by opening up new perspectives for economic elites, which consisted of small- and medium-sized enterprises. Islamic identity played an important role for their political and societal orientation because of their origin in more traditional provinces. Known as the “Anatolian Lions,” they established their own lobby and propagated Islamic values in the public sphere.²³ A further impact of the economic growth was the pluralisation of culture, which generally empowered groups, including religious ones, that so far had been excluded. In contrast to state-centred Islamist organisations like *Diyanet*, the society-oriented religious movement successfully mobilised the Turkish population. This “*oppositional Muslimness*”²⁴ tried to counter Kemalist positivism and scientism with a new language while concurrently fighting the traditional, oral “folk Islam” by emphasising the textual basis of Islam. The opportunity for a unified Islamist movement that could have undermined the regime was not exploited. Instead, various competing projects emerged that furthered the fragmentation of the movement.²⁵ One of those projects was realised in the rise of Erbakan’s *Welfare Party* (*Refah Partisi*, *RP*), which narrowly won the parliamentary election in

January 1996. The party turned into a mainstream party and won many followers in business and society with its vision of the *Fair Order* (*Adil Düzen*), even in bigger cities. More successful than any other party before them, the Welfare Party managed to mobilise and integrate ordinary people, who were not represented in the political process until then. However, different positions concerning the main goals of the party became apparent amongst its leadership. Influential leaders wanted to realise the *Fair Order* within the framework of an Islamic state, thereby questioning the Kemalist idea of the Turkish state. Erbakan's openly expressed refusal of integration into the EU, which he described as a "Zionist conspiracy," aroused distrust. His first travels abroad as prime minister to Libya and Iran openly breached the Turkish primacy of traditional Western orientation. These politics climaxed on February 28, 1997 in his forced resignation, the prohibition of the Refah party, and numerous lawsuits against party members. Erbakan's polarising politics went too far even for some of the leading party members. These reformists (*Yenilikçiler*) had already in the 90s criticised the adherence of the party to a state of cultural hegemony. Out of this group the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) evolved around the former Refah mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.²⁶ Thus, the Islamist challenging of Secularism, the foundation of the Turkish state, had proved to be a failure. Islamism as a revolutionary mainstream ideology geared towards total system change failed in Turkey.²⁷ The new AKP learned from the defeat of the Refah Party. The party founders, including the current minister for foreign affairs Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan, tried from the start to distinguish themselves from Erbakan's image and used constitutional reforms to challenge other areas of Kemalism.²⁸ Therefore the AKP, governing since November 2002, remains a test case for the coexistence of democracy and Islamist politics.²⁹

These developments in Turkey have strongly influenced the religious-political landscape of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, as the first generation of immigrants primarily identified with the events in their homeland. Immigrants in Germany not only followed the political events, but the distance enabled them to hold more extremist points of view than would have been possible in Turkey. Necmettin Erbakan, for example, was very popular as a charismatic speaker among the Turkish immigrants in Germany.³⁰ The prohibition of Erbakan's *Refah Party* and the formation of Erdoğan's AKP was mirrored in Germany by the separation between the *Kaplan community* and *Milli Görüş*.³¹ When the Turkish state realised how strongly non-state religious movements influenced the Turkish diaspora it led to a stronger engagement by the Turkish state-run Department of Religious Affairs via the German branch *Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği* (*DITİB*), which maintains approx. 740 mosques in Germany today.

Islamic Diaspora in Europe and Germany

Muslims have always lived in Europe whether as diplomats, students, academics, or business people. They have never been as strongly represented as today with many Muslims immigrating to European countries for different reasons over the last decades. The immigration to France, the UK, and the Netherlands can be traced back to the fact that these countries governed millions of Muslims in their colonial past.³² The immigration destinations for Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians are the Benelux countries and France; for Muslims from Turkey (ethnic Turks and Kurds) they are the Netherlands, France, the Scandinavian countries, and especially

Germany. The settlement in the respective host country has mainly taken place in industrial, metropolitan areas, either in big cities or in more remote settlements of old industry and within these places mostly in the less privileged quarters. In contrast to immigrant workers, immigrants from former colonies often held citizenship to their respective host countries, and had already learned the language and gained knowledge of the former colonial countries. Amongst these individuals were members from higher social levels, who had internalised the norms, values, and practices of the colonial centres. The last waves of immigrants brought a heterogeneous mix of people to Europe, including Islamic refugees and asylum seekers from Iraq, Somalia, Eritrea, and Afghanistan, or students from all kinds of countries and socio-economic circumstances.³³ When looking at the total figures a percentage of approximately 2-3% of the European population are Muslim. Those Europeans that, for various reasons, have converted to Islam can be added to that figure. This should not, however, hide the fact that on a regional or local level these numbers can be totally different, for example, in Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin, or in British cities like Bradford, where 350,000 Christians live together with approximately 85,000 Muslims. A total of approximately 3 million Muslims live in Germany of which 1.8 million are Turkish.³⁴ In the following section the role that religion plays for first- and second-generation immigrants will be discussed based on empirical studies.

The Role of Religion in the Diaspora

Societal Links

To the people affected, immigration means leaving behind a religiously determined surrounding and the beginning of life in a secular and democratic-pluralist environment. Whilst practising the religion is uncomplicated in countries with an Islamic majority, and its core ideas are rarely questioned, this is not always the case in foreign countries.³⁵ Furthermore, immigrants are faced with a high *expectation to assimilate* in a difficult environment. Immigrants mostly move to the poorest areas, workers quarters that have been largely deserted by the middle classes, such as Neukölln, Wedding, and Kreuzberg in Berlin. These overwhelmingly poor areas often face social problems like high unemployment, delinquency, gangs, overburdened schools, drug and alcohol abuse, street violence, broken families, and prostitution. These areas form the framework behind the development of the immigrants' religion, which, according to Schiffauer, first has to be viewed as a *problem solving strategy*.³⁶ Accordingly, the function of a mosque can be described as a social centre and self-help organisation.³⁷ An adolescent interviewed by Frese describes it as an important impact of religion to "get the people off the street, so they don't become criminal or delinquent."³⁸ People's engagement is taking place under a religious roof, although it is often closely linked with societal projects like integration courses, German language classes, and the promotion of ideas on how to spend free time for adolescents that grow up in social hot spots.³⁹

The early immigrant and worker communities were formed locally "from the bottom up." When local mosques became members of a larger umbrella organisation, it was mainly to use their religious infrastructure, meaning the recruitment of preachers, getting legal issues sorted out, or organising pilgrimages. The local mosques, however, maintained their influence. The relations within the communities remained close and multi-determined: people helped each other out when looking for

work or apartments, informed each other about low prices, supported each other in hard times, and prayed together. The shared foreignness increased solidarity so that the mosques functioned not only as a place of prayer but also as a second home in the immigrants' view. Amidst an incomprehensible and seemingly chaotic world these places of worship offered a place for retreat. The relation to the host country was rather instrumental, the social environment was barely noticed and vice versa. At that time, the prospect of return was rarely questioned on either side.⁴⁰

The religious need first fulfilled in the communities can be described as a defensive Islam.⁴¹ At the same time, the bitter and humiliating experience of being economically and socially on the losing side in the new society was met with a feeling of moral superiority. According to Alacacioglu,⁴² the immigrants' fear of losing their religious basis goes along with the general fear of losing their identity. There is no identity issue, however, as long as the assimilation into the host society remains purely instrumental and the immigrant has strong Turkish cultural-religious relations.⁴³ Hence, it is not surprising that even atheist Turks in Germany have suddenly committed to Islam again. Turning to the religious community counters the feeling of futility, loss of identity, and forsakenness. It also makes it easier to meet the fear of losing children to German society and becoming estranged from them.⁴⁴ It is not coincidental that the first mosques were established in Germany at a time in the early 70s when many families relocated from Turkey. In order to transfer religious knowledge to the next generation, a "*High Islamisation*" could be seen within diaspora communities. The first generation's knowledge of Islam when they came to Germany was geared towards folk Islam, popular practices of Islam in the homeland. Whereas in High Islam theologians interpret the Quran with the Sunnah on which the Sharia was developed as a written tradition, folk Islam has mainly been passed on orally.⁴⁵ The first generation of immigrants only received rudimentary religious education in their homeland, as they grew up during the years in which Islam and theological education were looked upon as undesirable by the Turkish government. What they know about their belief and religion originated less in regular religious education but rather in a traditional home and an Islamic society shaped by the Ottoman Empire. Many religious values that were actively practised until then had to be put into words to pass them on to the next generation. Religious disputes with their children forced the first generation to read the Quran. Thus, an engaged minority primarily organised in religious-political mosque communities has systematically furthered the expansion of the High Islamic body of knowledge.⁴⁶

This process of High Islamisation, which has been continued in the second generation, is not controlled "from the top down" but initiated "from the bottom up." It is reinforced by a Western, partly anti-Islamic discourse against which arguments need to be elaborated.⁴⁷ When parents continue to maintain their folk belief, their religious children, who like to see themselves as the real standard bearers of Islam, as they are often better educated, accuse them of practising Islam but not understanding it. They rather turn to High Islam, which stands for an intellectual-rational approach to Islamic sources.⁴⁸

Turning to a methodical-religious lifestyle took place abroad and went virtually unnoticed. Immigrants often only realised this when they went to Turkey and criticism towards the homeland arose.⁴⁹ "The Muslims there restrict themselves to prayer. We saw that on holiday. We told them no, Islam is not just prayer. Islam is life."⁵⁰ The above-mentioned conservative religious impetus of Turkish immigrants in Germany in the early 80s, which happened at the same time as the prohibition of

the Refah Party in Turkey and the revolution in Iran, found expression in the strong orientation towards and keeping of customs, and often showed in the exchange of Western clothing for a consciously-chosen, Islamic way of dressing. According to Schiffauer, newcomers from Turkey were astonished that in Kreuzberg they would meet more women wearing headscarves than in Istanbul.⁵¹ Religion quickly gained a new importance for Turkish immigrants in Germany. This differentiated Turkish people in Germany not only from their German environment but also from society in Turkey.⁵² As everywhere, where religions are newly established from the bottom up, in Germany, a long way from home, the interpretations of the Holy Scripture were fiercer than would ever have been possible in Turkey, due to the bureaucratisation of religious affairs through state involvement. Religious energy in the form of emotion and group enthusiasm broke out with a force that stunned the secular middle class (both German and Turkish). If hitherto religiously illiterate people interpret the word of God auto-didactically they may develop an overestimation of the self that can result from a direct “dialogue” with God and lead to extremist ideas, in a similar way to other religions, like early Protestant movements.⁵³ At the same time in the diaspora the original hierarchic structure of organised Islam in Turkey and the power of the state in defining religious matters were broken. Instead, religious styles diversified that are still competing with each other today. Another reason for Turkish immigrants to turn to Islam is the strong link between Islam and the Turkish national consciousness conveyed in the nationalist Turkish education system as well as in mosque communities.⁵⁴ The increased Islamisation can also be judged as a reaction to the behaviour of the German population towards immigrants, to legal inequality and social limitations. The presence of Muslims has become a topic on which many of the European right-wing parties campaign for political power. Their rhetoric is increasingly directed against immigration in general and against Muslims in particular.⁵⁵ At the same time, the treatment of Muslims in European states is also a topic for media discussion in the country of origin, which delivers “evidence” supporting the argument that the West is the natural enemy of Islam and Muslims and this must be interpreted as continuation of the crusades, the inquisition, and colonialism.⁵⁶

With the second generation the relation to the homeland, central to the parents' generation has decreased without being completely broken. While the first generation practised/practice a de-localised religion that was re-established in a foreign country, the *second generation* is re-orientating itself. For them the country their parents migrated to is their homeland. Their future is here, which is why they are trying to establish their religion here as a minority religion.⁵⁷ Due to their contact with Germans of the same age at kindergarten and school, the children of immigrants are confronted more often with behavioural patterns and interpretive models of the majority society, however, they also experience *discrimination and rejection* as foreigners. *Identity crises* and orientation problems are virtually pre-programmed. The religiousness of the second and third generation offers a lifestyle allowing them to cope with the challenges of modernity in a foreign country.⁵⁸ Members of the second generation often have a very intellectual approach towards Islam. They display a new self-confidence and read the Holy Scripture with the perspective that a person gains when going through a Western education system. The idea of a *community to join* becomes more important in relation to the community who someone belongs to, due to birth or residence; the idea of the need for religious mediators diminishes and a change towards a worldly outlook takes place, meaning that the world becomes an arena for action posing a challenge for believers.⁵⁹ While

religious affiliation for the first generation of immigrants was strongly shaped by their loyalty to Turkey, the affiliation of the second generation depends on the decision of the individual. "Group membership for the second generation means to consciously choose identification and maintenance of traditional and cultural elements (language; religion)." ⁶⁰ For these believers religion is no longer the armour that protects them from the daily threats but rather a skeleton that enables them to walk upright. We are no more dealing with a defensive practice of religion. ⁶¹

Olivier Roy interprets this development towards High Islam, not only taking place in Germany, as a continuous *isolation of the religion from the diaspora communities' cultures of origin*. Instead, more young Muslims identify with the global Islamic community, the *Ummah*. The redefinition of the religion in the course of globalisation and individualisation weakens the immigrants' culture of origin. ⁶² At the core of this development stands the newly inspired individual who finds a personal path to religion. Religion is practised in an individual way. This new religiousness is often anything but liberal; and while not necessarily violent, it is at the least very conservative. The gap between culture and religion often becomes very apparent in diaspora communities. Migration has torn the natural link between religion and society apart. In Turkey, Pakistan, and North Africa, for example, a person who is not a devout Muslim can obey the rules of fasting during Ramadan without any problems, because nearly everyone else does. A Muslim in Europe by contrast has some basic decisions to make. Are religious rules to play a central role in my life? Which rules are essential? How can I practise them? The believer is free in the practice of their religion. Depending on what they decide, they have to restructure their belief and separate it from the questionable societal norms and traditions in the new environment. For the second and later generations in particular, their parents' religion is embedded in a culture that is no longer their own.

The new *identification with the culturally independent global Ummah* becomes clear nowhere more than in demonstrations of solidarity with Islamic war victims worldwide, particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. ⁶³ An important pattern of Islamic radicalisation in the diaspora is the amalgamation of Islamic phraseology with a typical Western, anti-Imperialistic, and Third World extremism. The targets now are the same as those attacked by the European ultra-left in the 60s and 70s. Just like these left-wing groups, who developed non-violent channels to express their resentment, non-violent political conflict resolution can be expected from neo-orthodox political Islam, if that option is open. ⁶⁴ Significantly, devout Muslims show the weakest identification with Germany, whilst being politically the most interested in Germany's party system. ⁶⁵

Overall, this form of Islam has an ambivalent relation to the liberal West. The theological content of Islam being discussed in Islamic countries is ultimately less important than religious practice. Individual belief and the spiritual experience of the individual take centre stage. This apparent contradiction of High Islamisation ⁶⁶ and individualisation of religion ⁶⁷ is resolved by this view, according to Roy's theory, via the ongoing separation of religion and culture, as both developments take place at the same time and determine each other.

Individual Supporting Factors

On an individual level there is no clear sociological profile for young people particularly drawn to violent and radical Islamist ideas. Islamic radicalisation in

the diaspora is a phenomenon among young people, and socio-psychological factors seem to play a more important role than socio-structural ones.⁶⁸ The origin of religious radicalisation is often a personal feeling of dissatisfaction and insecurity caused by different events like experiences with discrimination, failure, or the futile effort to achieve social acceptance and integration. It is not uncommon that coming to terms with the identity crisis that accompanies social retreat is due to the influence of a person close to the individual who offers intellectual, emotional, or spiritual guidance.⁶⁹

Apart from individual development processes that create a special receptiveness to radical interpretations of religious doctrines, an *ethnic framing of the conflict between generations* in the diaspora is particularly important. Members of the second generation live in two opposing worlds at the same time: the Turkish and the German. On the one hand they are being brought up by their families in a traditional way with regard to religion and culture, whilst on the other they have to adapt to a Western-Christian culture outside of their family life. "Hamburg in the morning, Anatolia in the afternoon."⁷⁰ The German school world seems to be free, the Turkish family world rather regulated. Parents often mistake adolescent rebellion in these cases to be about ethnic categorisation of social environments, whereas in fact it is more about dissociation from the parents and a not uncommon generational conflict. Reducing the complexity of the situation, signs of rebellion and a questioning of their authority are interpreted as signs of "Germanisation."⁷¹ When the adolescents leave their sheltered schools and families they often find themselves confronted with increasing discrimination. They are shown that they are not wanted in this group, the German one, which they want to belong to in order to dissociate from their parents. They are thrown back to the group of origin from which they wanted to separate themselves.⁷² This rejection makes the identification with Germany very hard. The resulting conflict can take shape in different ways: aggression, depression, or identification with a radical Islamist group.⁷³ Due to its unstable identity, the second generation seems particularly open to radical positions.⁷⁴ In such contradictory situations it can offer a psychologically satisfying solution to turn to Islamist orientations, because turning to a radical fringe group offers a way out of the dilemma for adolescents. They express loyalty to and dissociation from the Turkish community and thereby their parents' generation, and at the same time it provides an intellectually satisfying identity in the diaspora by which strategies are developed to cope with the discrimination in German society. If the individual shows receptiveness to extremist ideas, this will be consciously used by members of extremist groups to recruit them and to deepen intellectual influence (*indoctrination*).⁷⁵ In particular, the religious movement as established by Sayyid Qutb and his follower Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's intellectual and spiritual tutor, offers points of contact. It builds upon a new self-confidence in its followers in which the intellect of each individual counts in a community that can be joined independently from birth or residence. It is an *offensive ideology* that propagates a different modernity.⁷⁶ The individualistic access to radical ideology offers a solution for adolescents who are looking for self-fulfilment, independence, and autonomy, as well as simple explanations for a complex world. Often violent radicalisation in the diaspora results from a narcissistic craving for attention typical for our individualised society.⁷⁷ *Pity* plays a role, too. If you are not exposed to the suffering yourself and push aside your own troubles then you can act in the name of others.⁷⁸ Acting out of pity for abstract third parties is a behavioural pattern that is also rampant

among social-revolutionary groups. It is so abstractly impersonal, free from political and religious structures that even the killing of people may seem legitimate. This feeling is supported by an *idea of justice* within religion and a very strong concept of equality in Islam.

Of course, this is only one possible way out of the identity dilemma. Religious direction has to be differentiated in the Islamic diaspora, too. In addition to missionary Islamism, and very rarely Jihadi-Islamism, *political Islam* is primarily represented in the diaspora as religious activism. This includes, as in the immigrants' homelands, positions that want to see Islam represented in a secular constitutional state (*legalistic*), as well as views based on the incompatibility of democracy and Islam, which are correspondingly revolutionary. The widespread neo-orthodox legalistic form of political Islam represented Europe-wide by Milli Görüs, for example, wants to realise a strict Islamic lifestyle geared towards the Quran and Sunnah in European secular civil society. Representatives of this position emphasise the right to distinctiveness and difference and fight for the rights of Muslims in European society.⁷⁹ When the legalistic form of political Islam leaves the political path, as was the case with the Kaplan community, because the legal instruments do not look promising, the movement takes on sect-like and missionary features, which can lead from isolation and estrangement to a disposition for violence and a shift towards the underground. The separation of the Kaplan community from Milli Görüs took place after the Religious Salvation Party (Millî Selamet Partisi, MSP), which was closely linked to the Milli Görüs communities in Germany, was prohibited in Turkey. In 1983, when the question of re-forming the party in Turkey came up, Cemalettin Kaplan, as the most radical preacher of the German Milli Görüs community, separated from the group, because he questioned the legitimacy of the leadership of an engineer like Necmettin Erbakan, and thought that the Turkish military would never allow the victory of an Islamist party in democratic elections. Kaplan held the position that, as in Iran, the focus should be on a purely revolutionary movement. His group increasingly isolated itself and got very caught up in profound anti-constitutional rhetoric. After they had left the *path of legitimate means*, members did not even shy away from violently fought internal rivalries that led to murder.⁸⁰

The remaining Milli Görüs structure predominately supported the separation of the reformists, who are currently governing in Turkey, from Erbakan's old structures and is controlled today by a partly younger leadership, which is trying to establish the vision of a European Islam concerned with traditional values. Europe will also become a spiritual home for Muslims, requiring a new relation to Islamic law, in which for example a permanent stay by Muslims outside Islamic countries is not intended.⁸¹ Still the fear of a new division within the diaspora shapes the relation to the Turkish partner organisation. People fear that by clearly showing their support for Erdogan as opposed to Erbakan they would make the first generation of immigrants homeless and therefore continue to also support Erbakan's extremism.⁸²

With regard to the situation of Turkish-Muslim diaspora communities in general, the separation of the Kaplan community and Turkish, state-controlled Islam becoming more active has led to *competition between Islamic communities* forcing them to develop a specific profile. The involvement of the state-run Department of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) poses a great challenge. By creating the DITIB, the department has reacted very late to the development of independent Muslim communities in the European diaspora critical of the regime. However, the department has significantly more funds available than the workers' communities (*Hodjas*, i.e.,

religious teachers, paid by the state, funds to buy mosque rooms, support for the consulates).

Overall, only a small number of the Muslims living in Germany turn to Islamism, which is understood as Islamist activism. About one third of second-generation immigrants are organised into clubs, although the number of religious-cultural clubs is significantly smaller than the number of general sports clubs. Only 10 to 15 percent of the Muslims here are members of German Islamic associations. The percentage of mosque visitors and sympathisers for all Turkish mosque associations is continuously decreasing amongst the younger age groups.⁸³

Conclusion

Islamism primarily manifests itself in a legalistic form of political Islam in a small part of the Turkish diaspora community in Germany. Although the neo-orthodox direction of organised religious practice that has a stabilising and identity-building effect, particularly for the second and third generation of immigrants, does not match the widespread liberal-secular understanding of religion in Germany, it has, at the same time, the biggest potential for integration. Religious extremism is most dangerous when individuals newly discover religion without the possibility of standing up for the practice of their belief through a domestic integration of organisational structures. This is also applicable to newly emerging Salafi circles preaching an all-encompassing Islam by trying to overcome traditional Islamic schools and thereby attracting believers from different ethnic backgrounds. Only the self-strengthening radicalisation that is taking place in separation and the dissociation from the political path, as, for example, in the Kaplan community, carries the danger of a negation of the social order that can lead to violence.

Islamic organisations in Turkey have relationships with communities in Germany. Even though they understand Islam in an Islamist way, they mainly choose the political path as pursued in Turkey, where, since the 70s, a religious-political movement can be observed. This direction of Islamism, in contrast to missionary or Jihadi movements, has taken on the basic precepts of a secular political system and is the form of Islamism that least tends towards violence and intolerant extremism.⁸⁴

Turkey, as a country of origin of immigrants, has not suffered the historic humiliation of colonialism. Immigrants of Turkish descent are therefore far less open to religious extremism than immigrants from other countries of origin, because personal experiences of discrimination are not interpreted within a culturally and historically predetermined pattern of existing guilt and enemy attributions.

In contrast, the tendency for individualisation within Western society, which in itself is absolutely harmless and supports a separation of culture and religion, has a radicalising effect when combined with experiences of discrimination and low opportunity for integration. The more young Muslims (irrespective of their ethnic origin) identify with the global *Ummah*, rather than with either the country of origin of their parents or Germany, the more open they become to all kinds of Islamist streams. Jihadists embed their violent messages in universal religious frames, which creates the impression that supporting violence is in agreement with religion. At the moment an expansion of the Salafiyya movement is taking place on the periphery of the Islamic world and in the European diaspora. This can barely be separated from its violent offshoot, the *Jihadi Salafiyya (al-Salafiyya al-jihâdiyya)*, which is very

attractive for young, increasingly mobile if not completely de-territorialised and mobile parts of the Islamic population.⁸⁵

For Muslims that, for different reasons, do not identify with either the country of origin of their parents or Germany, but who define their individual identity mostly along religious lines, several options are possible for practising their religion independently from culture. The active promotion of Islamic dogma, regulations, laws, or political programmes, which is defined as Islamism and is being practised by a part of the faithful, utilises mostly political channels, at least in Germany. However disconcerting the development of a common approach in the European Muslim population towards thinking and acting in purely religious terms independent from that culture may seem, violent extremism cannot be expected as long as Islamism appears in political categories. The danger of radical violence rather emanates from the apolitical forms of Islamism, which is why the support for a political Euro-Islam will contribute to the integration of Muslims and create a religious identity that is compatible with the West.

Notes

1. Frank Buijs and Jan Rath, *Muslims in Europe: The State of Research* (Amsterdam: IMES, 2006): 2.

2. International Crisis Group, *Comprendre l'Islamisme* (Kairo/Brüssel: ICG, 2005).

3. In their research survey about Islam in Germany, Worbs and Heckmann notice that Islam impacts more strongly on the daily life of its followers than is the case for other religious communities. Susanne Worbs and Friedrich Heckmann, "Islam in Deutschland: Aufarbeitung des gegenwärtigen Forschungsstandes und Auswertung eines Datensatzes zur zweiten Migranten- generation," in Bundesministerium des Innern, ed., *Islamismus* (Berlin: BMI, 2004): 148.

4. At the same time Jihadists use general religious frames like sections of the Quran (that are often taken out of their context), narrations and exclamations of the prophet (hadiths), theological essays or appeals to the Muslim solidarity with fellow Muslims who are suffering from Western influence, for example, in Iraq or the Palestinian areas occupied by Israel, to make their goals look more acceptable to a broader public. "Al-Qaeda gives back these original, timeless features to the enemy by using the labels of traditional authors: Ungodly, Heathen (Kâfir), Apostate (Murtadd) etc." in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., *Al-Qaida: Texte des Terrors* (München/Zürich: Piper, 2006): 19. See also Hans G. Kippenberg, "Consider That it is a Raid on the Path of God: The Spiritual Manual of the Attackers of 9/11," *NUMEN* 52 (2005): 29–58, Thomas Hegghammer, *Al-Qaida statements 2003–2004—A Compilation of Translated Texts by Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri* (Kjeller: Forsvarets Forskningstitutt, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2005) and Christina Hellmich, "Al-Qaeda—Terrorists, hypocrites, fundamentalists? The view from within," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 42. According to Scheffler a lot of Muslims worldwide agree with bin Laden's analysis that the West is responsible for most of the current problems of the Muslim world, but only the fewest see the armed Jihad as their religious duty. Thomas Scheffler, "Apocalypticism, Innerworldly Eschatology, and Islamic Extremism," in Ildikó Bellér-Hann and Lisette Gebhardt, eds., *Religion und Gewalt: Japan, der Nahe Osten und Südasien* (Halle: Orientwissenschaftliches Zentrum der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, 2003), 43–79.

5. International Crisis Group (see note 2 above), 3f. For specific streams, social movements and groups refer to Guido Steinberg, "Der Islamismus im Niedergang? Anmerkungen zu den Thesen Gilles Kepels, Olivier Roys und zur europäischen Islamismusforschung," in Bundesministerium des Innern, ed., *Islamismus* (Berlin: BMI, 2004), 19–42; and International Crisis Group, *Islamism in North Africa I: The Legacies of History* (Kairo/Brüssel: ICG, 2004), among many.

6. Historically the term political Islam is an American neologism that came up at the time of the Iranian revolution and implies that an "apolitical Islam" was the norm until Khomeini set new benchmarks. It seems more likely though that political Islam had only

turned apolitical in the short era of Arabian Socialism between 1945 and 1970 (before the Iranian revolution). The issue of political Islam was only broached as Islamic politics became anti-Western or rather anti-American meaning that Islam was considered political when it was perceived to become a threat. See also Sigrid Faath and Hans-Peter Mattes, *Nordafrika, Nah- und Mittelost zwischen Antiamerikanismus, Amerikakritik und Amerikanismus* (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient Institut, 2003): 332ff.

7. The resistance that arises under conditions of foreign occupation—including armed resistance—has to be seen as an exception. The transition to armed Jihad is blurred. The archetype for such a movement is the Palestinian Hamas. See Peter Waldmann, Matenia Sirseldudi, and Stefan Malthaner, “Where does the radicalisation process lead? Radical community, radical networks and radical subcultures,” in Magnus Ranstorp, ed., *Understanding Violent Radicalisation* (London: Routledge, 2009), 50–67, for emergent conditions and radicalisation processes of social movements.

8. Etymologically, the Arabian term means the effort to reach a certain object. It is also defined as the individual effort for the religion (Great Jihad) or for moral action and mission. In Islamic law it means one of the allowed forms of war to extend the Islamic regime or to defend it and is often called “Small Jihad.”

9. See Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “Middle East Salafism’s Influence and the Radicalization of Muslim Communities in Europe,” *MERIA Journal* 10, no. 3 (2006): 1–14.

10. See Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (2002): 22–42 for more about this remarkable change.

11. I restrict myself to only a rough description of Sunni activism. For an introduction to Shiite oriented Islamism, see Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, “Activist Shi’ism in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon,” in Martin E. Marty and Scott R. Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed* (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 403–456.

12. For a more elaborated study on this hypothesis see Matenia Sirseldudi, *Assessment of the Link Between External Conflicts and Violent Radicalisation Processes* (Study prepared for the European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation) (Brussels: JLS, 2006).

13. See the role of historic concepts of the enemy as structural cause for terrorist campaigns generally and the case of Iraq, in particular Matenia Sirseldudi, “Early Detection of Terrorist Campaigns,” in A. P. Schmid, ed., *Forum on Crime and Society: Special Issue on Terrorism* 4 (New York: United Nations, 2004), 71–92 and Matenia Sirseldudi, “Waren die terroristischen Anschlagskampagnen als Folgen des Dritten Golfkrieges vorhersehbar?,” in Björn Kilian et al., eds., *Nach dem Dritten Golfkrieg: Sicherheitspolitische Analysen zu Verlauf und Folgen des Konflikts* (Berlin: Wissenschaftsverlag, 2005), 96–116.

14. Bekim Agai, “Islam und Kemalismus in der Türkei,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 33–34 (2004): 18–24 and Pinar Tank, “Political Islam in Turkey: A State of Controlled Secularity,” *Turkish Studies* 6, nos. 1–3 (2005): 5.

15. Hasan Alacacioglu, *Außerschulischer Religionsunterricht für Muslimische Kinder und Jugendliche Türkischer Nationalität in NRW* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2000): 34f; and Hakan M. Yavuz, “Opportunity Spaces, Identity, and Islamic Meaning in Turkey,” in Q. Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 273.

16. Agai (see note 14 above), 19.

17. Today the department employs 100,000 people including prayer leaders, preachers, muezzins, and jurists. 70,000 mosques are subjected to it and maintained by the “General Directorate for Foundations.” The budget is bigger than that of the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Agai (see note 14 above) and Tank (see note 14 above).

18. Gilles Kepel, *Die Rache Gottes. Radikale Moslems, Christen und Juden auf dem Vormarsch* (München/Zürich: Piper, 1991).

19. Werner Schiffauer, “Islamischer Fundamentalismus—Zur Konstruktion des Radikal Anderen,” *Neue Politische Literatur* 40 (1995): 95.

20. Tank (see note 14 above), 7.

21. Party of National Order (1970–71), the National Salvation Party (1972–81), the Welfare Party (1983–98) and the Virtue Party (1997–2001) as well as the current Party of Blessedness and Justice and Development. *Ibid.*, 7.

22. Agai (see note 14 above), 20.

23. Tank (see note 14 above), 7 and Yavuz (see note 13 above), 272ff.
24. Yavuz (see note 15 above), 273.
25. *Ibid.*, 285.
26. Agai (see note 14 above), 18.
27. Revolutionary Islamist movements had a similar fate in other countries with a majority Muslim population. See Steinberg (see note 5 above) and Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Radical Islam: The death of an ideology?," *Middle East Policy* XI, no. 4 (2004): 86–95.
28. In 2004, for example, students of religious schools were granted access to universities. In April 2003, the first crisis between AKP members and the military arose when wives of politicians, who wore headscarves, were denied attendance at a ceremony in the presidential palace. Tank (see note 14 above), 13.
29. Tank (see note 14 above).
30. Werner Schiffauer, *Die Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs* (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina, 2005) and Eberhard Seidel, Claudia Dantschke, and Ali Yıldırım, *Politik im Namen Allahs. Der Islamismus—Eine Herausforderung für Europa*, 2nd edition (Brussels: Ozan Ceyhun, 2001), 105.
31. See *Ibid.*, 28ff.
32. Buijs and Rath (see note 1 above), 3.
33. *Ibid.*, 5f.
34. Additionally there are 156,000 Bosnians, 65,000 Iranians, 73,000 Moroccans, 58,000 Afghans, 51,000 from Iraq, and 31,000 from Pakistan who are mostly Muslims. Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, *Migrationsbericht 2005* (Nürnberg: BMBF, 2005): 104ff. There are also approx. 15,000 Germans that converted to Islam in Germany and approx. 800,000 naturalised Muslims, not only of Turkish decent, who are no longer being considered as foreigners in the statistics. See <http://www.islamarchiv.de> (last access 15 May 2010).
35. An adolescent interviewed by Frese says, for example, that his parents only had pastry to eat for a whole year because they did not know if there was pork in other food. Hans-Ludwig Frese, *Den Islam Ausleben. Konzepte authentischer Lebensführung Junger Türkischer Muslime in der Diaspora* (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2002): 87.
36. Werner Schiffauer, "Migration and Religion. A Special Relationship," *Fikrun wa Fann/Art and Thought* 83 (2006): 29–34.
37. A mosque, as an Islamic house of worship, only gains its sacred meaning from Muslims' prayers, meaning that the building itself does not have sacral character. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 145.
38. Frese (see note 35 above), 152.
39. *Ibid.*, 225.
40. Schiffauer, "Migration" (see note 36 above).
41. Schiffauer, *Die Islamische Gemeinschaft* (see note 30 above).
42. Alacacioglu (see note 15 above), 36f.
43. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 193.
44. Schiffauer, *Die Islamische Gemeinschaft*, (see note 30 above).
45. Ursula Mihciyazgan, "Die religiöse Praxis muslimischer Migranten. Ergebnisse einer empirischen Untersuchung in Hamburg," in Ingrid Lohmann and Wolfram Weiße, eds., *Dialog Zwischen den Kulturen. Erziehungshistorische und Religionspädagogische Gesichtspunkte Interkultureller Bildung* (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 1994), 196f.
46. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 191.
47. Mihciyazgan (see note 45 above): 201.
48. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 182f.
49. Frese (see note 35 above), 155.
50. Schiffauer, *Die Islamische Gemeinschaft*, (see note 30 above).
51. Schiffauer, "Migration" (see note 36 above).
52. Alacacioglu (see note 15 above), 35f.
53. Werner Schiffauer, *Islamism in the Diaspora: The Fascination of Political Islam Among Second Generation German Turks* (Frankfurt/Oder: Europa-Universität Viadrina, 1999): 4f.
54. The Turkish government, as well as some nationalistic oriented Turkish groups, appreciate the support and strengthening of the national consciousness of Turkish people in Germany. This has become particularly clear since government agencies have been propagating

the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” (Türk-Islam Milliyetçiliği) in Germany via the “Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs” (DITIB). Alacacioglu (see note 15 above), 37.

55. Indeed today, mainly Muslims are affected by the increase in racism. See, for example, the reaction of the football coach Seref Sucuoglu who gave up his profession because he did not want to put up with the increasing number of insults and because he feared for his safety. Yasin Alder, “Das Klima ist rauer geworden. In Sachen Rechtsextremismus bleibt die gestiegene Islamfeindlichkeit zumeist unerwähnt,” *Islamische Zeitung*, 1 November 2006, <http://www.islamische-zeitung.de/?id=7926>. More empirical verifications of an increasing hostility can be found in Rainer Dollase and Kai-Christian Koch, “Die Integration der Muslime,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 40–41 (2006): 22–26.

56. This discussion does not stay hidden to the diaspora communities in a globally linked public.

57. In Germany there is a distinction between “Religious Communities” organised under the law of association and “Religious Societies” that are public bodies. Only the latter are granted state privileges like the collection of church membership taxes and the organisation of religious education in line with their principles in public schools, following Art. 7(3) GG. Matthias Koenig, *Staatsbürgerschaft und Religiöse Pluralität in Post-nationalen Konstellationen. Inauguraldissertation* (Marburg: Philipps-Universität Marburg, 2003): 103f., 199f. The organisational incorporation of Islam into the German system of institutionalised relations between the state and religious communities is a great problem. This is particularly apparent in the example of the Muslim demand to be treated equally to other state-approved religious societies, especially with regard to the status of a public body. The denial of this status to Islamic organisations is justified by the fact that they are dominated by “foreigners” principally expected to return to their countries of origin, which means that the required criteria for time of habitation and stability are not fulfilled. Furthermore, it has been said that Islam was not appropriately represented and therefore lacks one main representative body. Most of the Islamic organisations that have evolved in Germany are therefore registered associations under civil law. *Ibid.*

58. Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); and Olivier Roy, “The Challenges of Euro-Islam,” in Adam Garfinkle, ed., *A Practical Guide to Winning the War on Terrorism* (Hoover Institution Press Publication: 2004), 77–88. Islamic adolescents are more strongly influenced by their religion in daily life than non-Islamic youth of the same age. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 161, 180.

59. International Crisis Group, “Islamism” (see note 5 above): 9f; and Gilles Kepel, *Der Prophet und der Pharao. Das Beispiel Ägypten: Die Entwicklung des muslimischen Extremismus* (München/Zürich: Piper, 1995): 35ff.

60. Rosemarie Sackmann und Tanjev Schultz, “Wir Türken . . . Zur kollektiven Identität türkischer Migranten in Deutschland,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 43 (2001): 40–45.

61. Schiffauer, “Migration” (see note 36 above).

62. Olivier Roy, “Wiedergeboren, um zu töten. Der terroristische Islamismus ist keine traditionelle, sondern eine höchst moderne Glaubensrichtung. Sie wurzelt in Europa,” *Die ZEIT*, 11 September 2006, <http://www.zeit.de/2005/30/islamismus>.

63. Regardless of the pro-Israeli politics of defence and foreign affairs in their country of origin, Turkey, which since the Iraq-war has become less outspoken (see Asiye Öztürk, “Das Entstehen eines Machtdreiecks. Ankara auf dem Weg nach Washington und Tel Aviv,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 33–34 (2004): 27ff) and the historically determined attitude of Germany in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the loyalty of religious second- and third-generation Muslims is mainly due to their Palestinian fellow believers. This attitude becomes an issue when anti-Israeli politics take on anti-Semitic traits (as for example the publications of the group Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which have now been prohibited in Germany), which is why the explicit alienation from anti-Semitic ideas has become a genuine part of many Islamic articles and contributions critical towards Israel. See the call for boycott of goods from Israel on the website of www.muslimmarkt.de, a forum critically acclaimed by the German security agencies, and the associated explanation in the biography of the website’s operator. Yavuz Özoguz and Gürhan Özoguz, *Wir sind “fundamentalistische Islamisten” in Deutschland. Eine andere Perspektive* (Nienburg: Betzel Verlag, 2003): 174ff. The situation has the potential to escalate after the events following the Israeli raid of the Gaza Flotilla, as the Flotilla was organised by

the Turkish branch of IHH (*İnsan Hak ve Hurriyetleri ve İnsani Yardım Vakfı*), an Islamic charity closely related to the broader Milli Görüş movement.

64. Roy, “The Challenges” (see note 58 above), 81.

65. They are the exception, because overall, Islamic interviewees in the EFFNATIS surveys are significantly less interested in German politics than non-Muslims. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 171, 158.

66. Mihciyazgan (see note 45 above).

67. Schiffauer (see note 19 above).

68. Roy, “The Challenges” (see note 58 above), 81; and Waldmann, Sirseldoudi et al. (see note 7 above); Frank J. Buijs, Froukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy, *Homegrown Warriors. Radical and Democratic Muslims in the Netherlands* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006); Peter Neumann and Brook Rogers, *Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant Movement in Europe* (London: ICSR, 2007); Magnus Ranstorp and Josephine Dos-Santos, *Threats to Democratic Values and Principles—The Current Situation in Malmö* (Stockholm: CATS, 2009).

69. *Ibid.* See also biographies of radical Islamists, in for example, Michael Taarnby, *Hani's Tale—Profile of a Terrorist* (Aarhus: Centre for Cultural Research University of Aarhus, 2002); Souad Mekhennet, Claudia Sautter, and Michael Hanfeld, *Die Kinder des Dschihad. Die neue Generation des Islamistischen Terrors in Europa* (München: Piper, 2006); Stefan Meining and Ahmet Senyurt, “The Case of the Bavarian Taliban,” in Hillel Fradkin et al., eds., *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Volume 7* (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute: 2008), 103–114; and Abdul Ghaffar El Almani, *Mein Weg nach Jannah* (Elif Medya: 2010), <http://de.scribd.com/doc/31071994/Schaheed-Abdul-Ghaffar-al-Almani-Mein-Weg-Nach-Jannah> (autobiography of Eric Breining, one of the most infamous German jihadists in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan, published on Jihadi websites the day after his death in May 2010).

70. Alacacioglu (see note 15 above), 43.

71. Schiffauer, “Islamism” (see note 53 above), 7ff.

72. 28% in West and 37% in East Germany do not want to have Turkish neighbours (according to a representative survey from 1999 in Berlin; today the percentages are most likely higher). Angelika Königseder, “Türkische Minderheit in Deutschland,” *Informationen zu politischen Bildung* 271 (2001): 22. More recent studies generally see an increase in the degradation of Islam. Dollase and Koch (see note 54 above); Wilhelm Heitmeyer, *Deutsche Zustände* (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2006); and Jürgen Leibold, Steffen Kühnel, and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, “Abschottung von Muslimen durch generalisierte Kritik?,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 1–2 (2006): 3–10.

73. Werner Schiffauer, “Auf der Suche nach Anerkennung im Spagat zwischen zwei Kulturen,” *Der Bürger im Staat* 51, no. 4 (2001): 226.

74. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 193. For more about the concept of “marginal men” see Everett Stonequist, *The Marginal Man: A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict* (New York: Scribner/Simon & Schuster, 1937): 96f.

75. For an illustrative description of the individual recruitment process see Mekhennet et al. (see note 69 above), 46ff; Ed Husain, *The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left* (London: Penguin Books, 2007) and El Alamani (see note 69 above).

76. Kepel, *Die Rache* (see note 18 above).

77. Suicide bombers view the recognition attained through immortality a payment for the lack of attention in life. One of the attackers in London looked straight into a surveillance camera at a petrol station just hours before the suicide attacks knowing that this picture would be seen worldwide later. Brendan O’Neill, “An explosion of pity,” *Spiked-online.com*, 21 July 2006, www.spiked-online.com/site/article/1284.

78. In analyses of recruitment videos of Jihadi organisations, the suffering and death of Islamic fellow believers by the hands of the “Crusaders and Jews” plays a great role. See also Hellmich (see note 4 above).

79. Whether the—in a comparison to European countries—particularly strong emphasis of difference of Muslim immigrants in Germany is rather a consequence of the historically exceptional case of Germany’s historic collective identity or of the collective identity in Turkey based on the Ottoman Empire has yet to be researched. PEW, *Muslims in Europe: Economic*

Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity (Washington, DC: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006).

80. Seidel et al. (see note 30 above), 61ff.

81. Schiffauer, *Die Islamische Gemeinschaft* (see note 30 above). In classic scripture a contractual status was intended that managed rights and responsibilities for a temporary stay. This is unsatisfying for a generation that sees Germany and Europe as their homeland. Also, the constitutional state cannot tolerate double standards and partial acceptance of the Sharia. Ursula Spuler-Stegmann, "Muslime in Deutschland. Organisationen und Gruppierungen," *Der Bürger im Staat* 51, no. 4 (2001): 223. The Sharia manages the relation between people and with God and includes not only criminal and civil regulations but also the ibâdât, the five pillars (credo, ritual prayer, fasting in the month of Ramadan, social contribution and pilgrimage, instructions for meals, behaviour in enemy territory or in the country of the contract, etc.). Additionally, religious freedom is basically granted when you want to convert to Islam, but it is, according to the Sharia, not allowed to turn your back on Islam which in the strictest case is punishable with the death penalty. *Ibid.*, 224.

82. This also explains why they do not distance themselves from the Milli Gazette read by Milli Görüs members in Germany. This attitude towards the party organ of Erbakan's old movement, and the anti-Semitic and anti-Western statements in the Gazette, give the German Verfassungsschutz consistent reason to observe Milli Görüs with suspicion. Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria decline German citizenship to all members of Milli Görüs because of this and public agencies are instructed to avoid public discussion with Milli Görüs. Schiffauer, *Die Islamische Gemeinschaft* (see note 30 above). The new developments around the ban of the German branch of IHH, which is closely related to Milli Görüs, after the events following the Israeli raid on the Gaza Flotilla, also contribute to a delegitimation of the organisation in general (see note 63 above).

83. Worbs and Heckmann (see note 3 above), 191.

84. The broader radicalising impact of the Turkish political reactions following the Israeli raid on the Gaza Flotilla, drawing Turkey as direct stake-holder into the Middle East conflict, still have to be assessed in their long-range impact.

85. Roy, *Globalized Islam* (see note 58 above), 304f.